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HEADQUARTERS 6TH ARMY GROUP  
Office of Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2  
APO 23, U. S. Army

*9185  
war off London*

WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NUMBER 28

FOR THE WEEK ENDING 31 MARCH 1945

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:CG, 6th Army Group :  
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1. SUMMARY OF THE ENEMY SITUATION

a. Estimate of the Enemy Situation

Army Group G, after its overwhelming defeat in the SAAR-PALATINATE, has been able to organize cohesive resistance only at a few widely scattered critical points deep behind the conquered river barrier. Its twenty-eight divisions, of which at least eleven must now be accounted destroyed, left 62,000 prisoners of war west of the Rhine. In addition, 52,000 prisoners were taken from its non-divisional units. Similarly staggering losses in heavy weapons and transport equipment, coupled with the almost complete disorganization evident in the retreat across the Rhine and the denial of an opportunity to gain a respite, have prevented and will continue to prevent effective regrouping and refitting. These same factors further minimize any enemy capability to launch more than local counterattacks against the 6th Army Group.

Army Group G not only failed to contain the GERNESHEIM (M 5430) bridgehead, but, even more fatal, found itself incapable of guarding the FRANKFURT-ASCHAFFENBURG gateway to the KASSEL corridor. The resultant exposure of Army Group B's flank and rear will end with the encirclement and destruction of that command, leaving General HAUSSER dependent on only his own resources to stave off a similar fate. He must now defend all approaches to NUREMBERG and MUNICH with forces which are already too thin for their 200 mile front. As long as the High Command continues to follow its policy of throwing all its resources against the most imminent threat, HAUSSER will enjoy a second priority at best and must make shift with hastily organized training and convalescent units. Their necessarily piecemeal commitment as stopgaps will render them ineffective. Only strong armored formations in strength sufficient to blunt our own armored thrusts could make positional warfare even a temporarily successful possibility for the enemy. There are none to be had, unless some panzer divisions could be disengaged from the Eastern Front.

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Seventh German Army now enters its third week with an exposed right flank. Its rapidly extending area of responsibility has so spread its divisions that they are able only to man potential BASTOGNES and critical terrain features. The lack of mobile or armored reserves make it vulnerable to wide outflanking tank drives when ever its infantry is pinned by strong contact with Allied forces. It is definitely beyond the powers of this Army to reestablish contact on its right with the Fifteenth German Army. Should it lose contact with the First German Army on the south, Seventh Army's collection of divisional numbers will be wiped from the map.

First German Army retreated across the Rhine in obvious need of both time and reinforcements. On the contrary, it was immediately called upon to supply troops for the previously vacant KARLSRUHE-GERMERSHEIM sector of the SIEGFRIED Line and blocking forces for the WORMS-ASCHAFFENBURG area. This dissipation of already inferior strength has overtaxed its ability to hold the key Rhine Valley cities and the mass of of the ODENWALD features. Its mission to protect the avenues leading to the east is likewise doomed to failure as long as the necessary mobile reinforcements remain unavailable.

Nineteenth German Army, reduced to a training command after its defeat, has become the last resource for Army Group G. The advance of Allied divisions is forcing upon it the necessity to become operational before it has had time to replace the manpower drained by the armies to the north. With a temporarily static front along

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the Rhine of over 100 miles manned by troops whose positional duties will render them ineffective once their strongpoints have been bypassed, the Nineteenth Army is equally in danger of having its right flank rolled up and of subsequent encirclement. To carry out its mission it can depend only on a few new recruits from the interior of Germany, since Wehrkreis V has already been exhausted by previous drafts, and on the convalescents who fill the camps in its area. The present state of 553 Volksgrenadier Division, which spent two months reforming at PFORZHEIM, is indicative of what will be met. In general, the lack of trained troops in the various arms and services will not permit the production of balanced formations even for the few battered staffs now trying to regain some effectiveness in the Upper Rhine area.

Twenty-fourth Army continues its training and defensive missions along the Swiss border.

The turn of military events is effectively destroying the "National Redoubt" for want of both territory and personnel. Any retreat into the mountains of southeastern Germany will hardly be voluntary on the part of the German leaders. In fact, this projected ultimate concentration area is much more likely to terminate as a concentration camp area.

**b. Capabilities**

The enemy is completely restricted to a single capability: to withdraw into the interior of Germany before our advancing forces.

Army Group G is faced with the almost insurmountable task of containing Allied armor spearheads directed deep into the heart of South Central Germany. Nineteenth Army must attempt to prevent the rolling up of the SIEGFRIED Line in BADEN from the rear. The almost completed encirclement of Army Group B and the deep penetrations beyond the forward positions of First Parachute Army threaten to expose all Northern Germany, west of a line KASSEL-HANOVER. Any troops made available for the western front must be directed to the north to carry out at least blocking attempts. Thus, Army Group G and Nineteenth Army must carry on in their extending areas with extremely few replacements. Finally, the lack of armor in reserve forshadowes the enemy's future loss of large areas of military productivity which in turn will further reduce his ability to resist. Immobile troops may hold in a few scattered areas, but they will be isolated and cleaned up with only minor difficulties.

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2. 6th ARMY GROUP FRONT (Odenwald Front)

a. At the close of the period, the front lines of enemy forces opposite 6th Army Group were as follows: GELNHAUSEN (N 0379), KAHL (M 9146), ASCHAFFENBURG (N 0054), REISTENHAUSEN (N 1331), WERBACH (N 3720), TAUBERBISCHOFSHHEIM (N 3815), DALLAU (S 0598), MOOSBRUNN (R 8692), SPEYER (R 5080), South along Rhine to BASLE (A 8783).

b. ARMY GROUP G (CG: SS Gen. HAUSSER)

The rapidly expanding front of Army Group G and the need for rearward displacement of higher headquarters in the face of Allied advances, has caused some confusion as to the exact locations of specific corps. However, LXXXIX (CG: Lt. Gen. HOEHNE), XC (CG: Lt. Gen. PETERSEN), LXXXII (CG: Maj. Gen. HAHM), XIII (CG: Lt. Gen. von ORIOLA), XIII SS (CG: SS Maj. Gen. MAX SIMON), LXXX (CG: Lt. Gen. BAYER), and LXXXV (CG: Lt. Gen. KNISS) Corps are believed to be still under the control of First German and Seventh German Armies.

The reason for listing some of the divisions considered destroyed for all practical purposes, is to indicate troops or remnants of units involved in defensive fighting in widely scattered sectors.

257 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Brig. Gen. SEIDEL) fought stubbornly in its SIEGFRIED Line sector east of HOMBURG until the withdrawal of the remnants of First and Seventh Armies across the Rhine was completed. Due to the protection afforded by strong defensive positions and the short route of withdrawal, casualties were light by comparison with other Army Group G divisions. The Division lost only 900 prisoners. Consequently combat infantry effectives are estimated at approximately 1,000. At the end of the period the division was holding the east bank of the Rhine, from KARLSRUHE to about R 5072.

(1) Seventh German Army (CG: ) (Left Flank Units)

2 Panzer Division (CG: LAUCHERT) formed a few weak battle groups out of the personnel that it extracted from the SAAR-PALATINATE. These are now in line north of ASCHAFFENBURG in the BUEDINGER WALD (N 08). All tanks are believed to have been lost east of the Rhine where 1,500 prisoners of 2 Panzer Division were taken. Combat infantry strength is judged at 400.

6 SS Mountain Division (CG: SS Maj. Gen. BRENNER) managed to pull its fast shrinking units out of a number of successive traps. The division lost 1,400 prisoners during the SAAR-PALATINATE operation. Last contact was reported in the vicinity of H 0307 where about 1,000 combat infantry effectives are believed to have been gathered.

5 Parachute Division (CG: ) was committed at KOBLENZ until Rhine crossings by our troops obliged it to withdraw via the GIESSEN area where divisional elements were pocketed. Units which escaped were moved south east to the general area M 9895. Recent losses have been heavy and present combat infantry strength is estimated at 600.

159 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Brig. Gen. BUERCKY) was virtually destroyed in the BAD KREUZNACH-WORMS region where it lost 2,400 prisoners. Remnants were gathered and sent into line north of ASCHAFFENBURG in the general area N 07. Combat infantry effectives are estimated at 300.

36 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Brig. Gen. WELIM) succeeded in withdrawing its depleted units across the Rhine between MANNHEIM and KARLSRUHE. After reassembling there, the division moved to the north-east and was committed immediately south-east of ASCHAFFENBURG. The following identifications were made on 30 March: 165 Volksgrenadier Regiment at N 0251; 87 Volksgrenadier Regiment at N 0447; 36 Reconnaissance Battalion. The division lost 2,000 prisoners in addition to many dead and wounded during the course of operations west of the Rhine after 15 March. Present combat infantry strength is estimated at 700.

416 Infantry Division (CG: Maj. Gen. PFLIEGER) gathered a number of stragglers which were assembled in area N 1244 for commitment at ASCHAFFENBURG. Some divisional remnants appear to be still operating under command of 36 Volksgrenadier Division. However, the divisional staff is believed to be in control of the bulk of its own remnants and of the remains of 256 Volksgrenadier Division.

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Infantry Division lost 3,500 prisoners during the final stages of the SAAR-PALATINATE campaign. Combat infantry strength is judged at 300.

256 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Brig. Gen. FRANZ) was identified by a prisoner of Headquarters Company who stated that divisional remnants were collected at ASCHAFFENBURG on 27 March from HEIDELBERG and were told to report to 416 Infantry Division in area N 1244. This indicates that remnants of the two divisions were merged prior to their probable subordination to 256 Volksgrenadier Division. Almost 3,000 prisoners of this division were taken during the last two weeks. Even after the conversion of service troops, not more than 400 combat infantry effectives remain.

(2) First German Army (CG: Lt. Gen. FOERTSCH)

After the shattering blows received by the First Army in the SAAR-PALATINATE and during its retreat across the Rhine, seven of its divisions were virtually destroyed, the rest decimated. The Army was unable to offer anything but scattered opposition against our advances east of the Rhine. Opposition was generally centered around localities and non-combatant arms of the Wehrmacht and the Volkssturm were committed as infantry to reinforce the totally inadequate regular combat troops. Without substantial replacements in both men and materiel and without receiving a substantial breathing spell the Army cannot hope to stem the Allied tide.

47 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Maj. Gen. BORK) crossed the Rhine in widely scattered straggler groups. Some of these were reassembled and are now located in the woods in area R 6182. Their commitment in the Rhine Valley south of MANNHEIM appears imminent. Combat infantry strength of all salvaged elements is estimated at 800. The division lost over 1,600 prisoners in the SAAR-PALATINATE operation.

Division RAESSLER (CG: Brig. Gen. RAESSLER) succeeded in withdrawing a part of its amalgam of units from the WISSEMBOURG region. These are believed to be manning defenses along the Rhine from KARLSRUHE to RASTATT. The division lost 1,400 prisoners and its present combat infantry effectives are estimated at approximately 600.

553 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Brig. Gen. HUETEKER) was contacted as elements of 1119, 1121 Volksgrenadier Regiments and 553 Fusilier Battalion were identified in the vicinity of M 8321 on 28 March. At the end of the period, the division was believed to hold a sector from MILTENBERG (N 1024) to AMORBACH (N 0717). Prisoners stated that, prior to its latest commitment, the division had been reforming in the KARLSRUHE area. The division remained out of contact since the end of January. However, the extent and sources of replacements have not as yet been ascertained. Combat infantry strength is not believed to exceed 1,500.

352 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: ) was virtually destroyed again in the SAAR-PALATINATE. It netted over 2,500 prisoners during the past two weeks. Remnants now committed in the WALLDUERN area (N 1810) do not add up to more than 300 combat infantry men.

246 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: KUEHNE) continues to lay claim to a nominal existence as it staved off complete annihilation by assembling some stragglers into a battle group formation that was identified at M 7618 on 28 March. Combat infantry strength of this unit is estimated at 400.

17 SS Panzer Grenadier Division (CG: Col. KLINGENBERG). Elements were identified at HANAU (M 8571) where they staged a counterattack on 27 March. A reliable source locates elements in the GERMERSHEIM (R 4669) - WIESLOCH (R 7078) area. The divisions disorderly retreat from the SAAR region suggests the possibility that elements are located in both areas. The division lost 3,000 prisoners and organic combat infantry strength is estimated at 500 including recovered stragglers.

559 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Brig. Gen. von der MUEHLEN) was largely destroyed in the BAD KREUZNACH region. Regiments were collected in Battle Groups SCHUETZ and SATTLER and were committed east of HEIDELBERG. The 696th Grenadier

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Regiment of 549 Infantry Division which was reforming in DARMSTADT when we crossed the Rhine, and was therefore unable to join its division engaged on the REMAGEN Bridgehead, became attached to 559 Volksgrenadier Division. Including 696 Grenadier Regiment, divisional combat infantry strength is estimated at 900. 4,600 prisoners of 559 Division were captured west of the Rhine.

198 Infantry Division (CO: Col. BARTEL) crossed the Rhine fairly early and managed to escape, organizationally intact, although it lost 2,400 prisoners. Apparently the division regrouped south of MANNHEIM, and elements were contacted in the HEIDELBERG area, where 198 Fusilier Battalion and 235 Artillery Regiment were identified on 30 March. Divisional combat infantry effectives are estimated at approximately 6-800.

719 Infantry Division (CO: ) lost 3,700 prisoners in the SAARBRUCKEN pocket and in its retreat across the RHINE. Among others, Major Gen. GAEDE, its commander, was captured. Such remnants as have been reassembled are committed in the Rhine Valley, south of MANNHEIM. The infantry combat effectives of these remnants are estimated at 400.

905 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: ) was one of the last units to withdraw from its West Wall positions east of the Rhine. Severe casualties were suffered during this prolonged defense, including 1,300 prisoners taken since 15 March. The remnants, probably some 400 combat infantry effectives, are disposed along the Rhine north and south of SPEYER.

(3) Nineteenth German Army (CG: )

It is accepted that the Defence Command OBERRHEIN has been dissolved and that its functions have been taken over by Nineteenth Army, subordinated to Army Group G.

Consequently Nineteenth Army exercises control over the units manning defenses along the Rhine from BASLE to KARLSRUHE. The LXIV and XVIII SS Corps continue to assume responsibility for the two sectors south of KARLSRUHE. The 189, 708 and 716 Divisional Staffs represent a future defensive power of the army and are presently believed in the process of rebuilding. A fairly reliable source reports that headquarters of a Brigade BAUER are located at KANDERN (V 9402). It remains to be seen whether the Brigade equates with 1005 Brigade which is carried in the same general area.

189 Volksgrenadier Division (CO: Lt. Col. JUNGE). Combat troops and some service personnel of this division were absorbed by 338 Infantry and 16 Volksgrenadier Divisions at the end of February. The staff, however, remained in the Black Forest. It is presently believed to be receiving a few young recruits, convalescents, Volkssturm and to be picking up stragglers to reform the division.

716 Infantry Division (CO: Col. HAFNER). After its defeat in early February, this division had to sacrifice its remaining personnel to help rehabilitate 159 Volksgrenadier and 198 Infantry Divisions. Its staff is believed to have stayed in the Black Forest where like 189 and 708 Volksgrenadier Divisions, it is probably rebuilding its subordinate units.

(a) LXIV Corps (CG: Maj. Gen. GRIMMEISS)

The Corps is responsible for the northern portion of the BASLE - KARLSRUHE sector.

405 Reserve Division (CG: Maj. Gen. SEEGER) remains along the Rhine, north and south of KEHL (W 0596).

708 Volksgrenadier Division (CO: Col. BLECKWENN). Supply establishments (Ib) of this division were located by agents at ETTENHEIM (W 0561). It is probable that the division which had been cannibalized by other units is reforming in this area.

(b) XVIII SS Corps (CG: )

This Corps holds the southern part of the BASLE-KARLSRUHE sector. Exact boundaries are not known.

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805 Mobilization Division (CG: Brig. Gen. von OPPEN). No change.

1005 Brigade Staff (CO: ). A report locating a Brigade BAUER at KANDERN (V 9402) points to two possibilities. Either this unit equates with 1005 Brigade or it is a separate Brigade. In the latter case, the sector in which 1005 Brigade was previously carried would be shared by the newly identified unit. Brigade BAUER is stated to be in command of 8 Grenadier Regiment OBERRHEIN.

(c) Twenty-Fourth Army (CG: Lt. Gen. HANS SCHMIDT)

No change in mission has yet been ascertained.

(d) Prisoners Yielded by Divisions in SAAR-PALATINATE  
(Period 13/3/45 - 25/3/45)

DIVISION	PRISONERS BY SEVENTH ARMY	PRISONERS BY THIRD ARMY	TOTAL
2 Pz	30	1522	1522
11 Pz	2	78	80
17 SS PG	2237	667	2904
2 Mtn	167	4313	4480
6 SS Mtn	129	1244	1373
9 VG	93	1662	1755
16 VG	2390	269	2659
19 Inf	1559	169	1728
36 VG	1945	62	2007
47 VG	1099	559	1658
79 VG	174	3025	3199
159 VG	57	2363	2420
167 VG	0	235	235
198 Inf	14	2358	2372
212 VG	172	5207	5379
245 (Elts)	568	30	598
246 VG	94	3099	3193
257 VG	871	0	871
256 VG	568	2389	2957
276 VG	0	93	93
277 VG	0	191	191
326 VG	2	709	711
340 VG	196	374	570
347 Inf	2598	718	3316
352 VG	112	2412	2524
416 Inf	643	2863	3506
553 VG	7	221	228
559 VG	1010	3598	4608
719 VG	2568	1165	3733
905 VG	1312	0	1312
RAESSLER	1373	0	1373
T O T A L	22026	42420	64448

NOTE: PW tabulations include only PW's actually processed by Army cages.

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(g) ENEMY STRENGTH OPPOSITE 6TH ARMY GROUP  
(First and Nineteenth German Armies)

Combat Infantry Effectives of Divisional Units: \*

Seventh German Army	4,900
First German Army	6,600
Nineteenth German Army	4,000

TOTAL	15,500
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Reserves: (Estimated)

First German Army	-----
Nineteenth German Army	1,000

TOTAL	16,500
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Tanks and SP Guns:

Seventh German Army	30-40
First German Army	40-50
Nineteenth German Army	15-20

TOTAL	85-110
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(\*) Excluding miscellaneous non-divisional units.

3. 6TH ARMY GROUP FRONT (Alpine Front)

At the close of the period the enemy front lines opposite the 6th Army Group on the Alpine Front were as follows: CHAMONIX (C 4728), MT ROSELETTE (Z 4091), BOURG ST MAURICE (Z 5080), VILLAROGIER (H 4692), BESSANS (H 5260), MT TABOR (K 3522), BRIANCON (P 3898), CHATEAU QUEYRAS (P 5382), GUILLESTRE (P 4170), BARCELONETTE (P 4341), ISOLA (N 4635), ST MARTIN (N 6020), GRIMALDI (S 8088).

a. Enemy Dispositions

Identifications by prisoners of war confirm the presence of II Battalion 100 Mountain Regiment (5 Mtn Div) and VARESE Battalion (4 Alpine Regt, LITTORIO Div) in the PETIT ST BERNARD region. While 5 Mountain Division has provided a considerable number of March Battalions for other front, the division is still present in sufficient strength to effectively control the Italian units on the front. Fair sources report that additional elements of the MONTE ROSA Division are being moved from the Appenine Front to the French border region. This follows the trend of movement of Italian units into the area to aid or gradually take over from the German units.

b. General

The enemy has been content with limited activity. Diversionary raids have been infrequent. Artillery exchanges and normal patrolling have characterized the activity of the front. No reports of withdrawals from the front have been substantiated.

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a. RHINE FRONT

The Rhine front from BASLE to SPEYER remained relatively inactive. The enemy sent daily patrols and raiding parties across the River for intelligence purposes and to harass Allied troops. Approximately 100 men using nine boats crossed the Rhine east of MARCKOLSHEIM (V 8652) during the early hours of 26 March but withdrew several hours later. On 28 March about 30 Germans were engaged in the vicinity of PLOBSHEIM (W 0186), and the strongpoint at V 8737 near FORT MORTIER was unsuccessfully attacked by an enemy group. A patrol of nine Germans dressed as American civilians entered GEISWASSER (V 9031) on 29 March, and questioned inhabitants, referring to themselves as a control party. Artillery and mortar fire was light and scattered during the beginning of the period, however, it was increased to moderate toward the end of the period. COLMAR received some 240 mm railway fire from enemy guns located in the KAISERSTUHL on several nights toward the end of the period.

b. SOUTH-CENTRAL FRONT

As the period opened, the last remaining pockets of organized enemy resistance west of the Rhine were being liquidated. 257, 905 and RAESSLER Divisions had held stubbornly to fortifications in the BIENWALD and were the last of the forces of Army Group G to withdraw across the river. By 25 March mopping up along the west bank had been completed but stragglers and scattered groups of enemy continued to be found in rear areas throughout the period. Many German officers had left their units with hopes of making good their escape but found themselves completely cut off. Included among these were Lt. Gen. FRANZ SENSFUSS, Commanding General of 212 Infantry Division, along with his Chief of Staff, and Lt. Gen. GAEDE, Commanding General of 719 Infantry Division.

Not pausing in the pursuit of the depleted German Armies, Allied forces established a bridgehead on the east side of the Rhine early 23 March. Initial advances cleared TREBUR (M 4847) and LEEHEIM (M 5040) against only scattered opposition. The rapid expansion of the bridgehead engulfed DARMSTADT and reached ASCHAFFENBURG (N 0253) which was entered late 25 March. Bridges over the Main River were taken intact at STOCKSTADT (M 9554) and HANAU (M 8572). FRANKFURT was entered the following day. By this time the enemy had mustered sufficient miscellaneous units to offer some, although ineffective, oppositions to Allied advances. Counterattacks were undertaken in the ASCHAFFENBURG area and heavy opposition was being encountered in HANAU and FRANKFURT. At the same time replacement and antiaircraft battalions offered moderate opposition to further Allied crossings of the Rhine in the WORMS area.

With the bulk of the potential enemy resistance overcome at the river line, Allied forces expanded eastward and southward to the west shoulder of the ODENWALD and the Neckar River respectively. A committee of citizens surrendered MANNHEIM on 29 March after enemy forces had withdrawn under cover of light artillery fire. Opposition in this area continued light and scattered. The Neckar River having been crossed, HEIDELBERG was cleared on 30 March against almost negligible resistance. Meanwhile, the enemy fought an unsuccessful delaying action in the ODENWALD. By the end of the period the ODENWALD had been cleared but the enemy remained very sensitive in the ASCHAFFENBURG region. Here remnants of miscellaneous divisions operating under 36 Volksgrenadier Division and 416 Infantry Division offered repeated counterattacks and contested strongly all attempted advances. South of the ASCHAFFENBURG area, the Main River was crossed and advances east were practically unopposed. At the end of the period, friendly units were nearing WURZBURG.

Allied units proceeding north from the FRANKFURT-HANAU area joined forces with other units from the REMAGEN Bridgehead. GIESSEN was taken and by the end of the period, friendly troops were nearing PADERBORN, KASSEL, and EISENACH.

c. ALPINE FRONT

Enemy forces on the FRANCO-ITALIAN border were engaged in improving defensive positions and some patrol activity. Hill 2655 vicinity PETIT ST BERNARD, which was occupied by Allied forces on 23 March, was unsuccessfully attacked by an enemy patrol on 24 March. In the same region, one German and 13 Italians were captured on 26 March during a light engagement. Friendly forces withdrew due to unfavorable weather. Work continued on the defenses in the MONTENAPPEL, AMER, PASS, and PETIT ST BERNARD regions. Artillery fire was generally light and scattered during the period.

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d. ATLANTIC FRONT

Activity in the Atlantic pockets was confined to occasional exchanges of artillery and automatic weapons fire and several patrol clashes. Throughout the period the enemy continued work in the vicinity of ST VIVIEN (R 3653) in the GRAVE zone. Approximately one company constructed defenses along a line from Y 448691. to Y 449695 in the ROYAN pocket. LA ROCHELLE had less activity this week than during previous periods.

5. COMMUNICATIONS

A. Tactical Reconnaissance

Visual reconnaissance throughout the period was greatly hampered by unfavorable weather, but even when fairly good coverage was available, as on 24 and 25 March, very little rail or road activity was observed. Strong American crossings of the Rhine between MAINZ and MANNHEIM forced enemy activity on roads and railroads in the Rhine Valley to shift to routes further east with STUTTGART appearing to be the hub of activity. From here north-south lines through HEILBRONN showed use on both the 24th and 25th and the limited movements seen seemed to indicate a continuance of moves to the east. Throughout the BLACK FOREST region light to moderate activity was sighted along the ROTTWEIL-STUTTGART, OFFENBURG-DONAUESCHINGEN and TASTATT-FREUDENSTADT lines on these same days but observations were too scanty and scattered to warrant any definite conclusions.

Light rail activity was seen in the KARLSRUHE-MANNHEIM area on 24 and 26 March and 2 military rakes were observed at GRABEN (R 5563) on the 24th. Marshalling yards in this area showed moderately heavy loadings on 24 and 25 March. Road activity was at a minimum throughout this sector although a large concentration of what appeared to be camouflaged motor transports was seen extending for half a mile along both sides of the road southeast of DURLACH at R 5542 on 24 March.

STUTTGART marshalling yards and rail lines leading to and from the city were reported active on both 24 and 25 March probably indicating that the city is now one of the main focal points for incoming and outgoing traffic in this sector of GERMANY. Always a large communications center, its importance cannot but have grown in the light of recent events since American advances have now threatened or actually taken many of the other large cities throughout the Rhine Valley.

Heavy barge activity on the Neckar was noted whenever coverage was available and as many as 1,000 barges were seen between HEIDELBERG and HEILBRONN on 26 March. Scattered motor and horse drawn transports were seen along roads from HEIDELBERG to EBERBACH and as far east as WURZBURG with most of the traffic moving to the east.

B. Effects of Allied Air Attacks

a. Communications

Although poor weather in the latter part of the week grounded Allied medium bombers and greatly limited fighter bomber operations, the clear days preceding were used to considerable advantage to block rail traffic from crossing the Neckar River and feeding supplies and reinforcements to enemy forces opposing the Allied bridgeheads between MANNHEIM and MAINZ.

Aside from the rail line nearest the Rhine, which was subject to artillery interdiction, the enemy had three main entrances to the battle area: at HEIDELBERG, NECKARGEMUEND, and EBERBACH. The line through HEIDELBERG was cut by an attack on a bridge north of BRUCHSAL on 24 March and by damage to the HEIDELBERG bridge last week. The central line was cut at the Neckar by the continued impassability of the NECKARGEMUEND bridge, while the main north-south line STUTTGART-HEILBRONN-MOSBACH-EBERBACH was interrupted at five points as of 27 March by impassable or destroyed bridges. While it was not anticipated that enemy rail traffic would be very large, this interdiction of the battle area must nevertheless have reduced to a mere trickle the traffic which did manage to get through; the small amount of traffic on the STUTTGART-HEILBRONN line must have been effected either by rapid repair to the BLITZGHEIM bridge, or by shuttle operations on either side of the damaged structure.

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b. Supplies

While none of the attacks were in 6th Army Group's area proper, the success of the Allied air offensive against the enemy's gasoline supplies is significant for its extremely limiting effects on his defensive capabilities. It is estimated by the Combined Strategic Targets Committee on Oil Production and POL Depots that the current rate of enemy gasoline output is a mere 33,000 tons, or about 6 per cent of production a year ago. It is estimated furthermore that output in April will not exceed 80,000 tons, or 15 per cent of pre-raid output, even if no more attacks on enemy gasoline producing plants are carried out. The enemy's tactical oil supplies, particularly important in view of the extremely low level of new production, were dealt a serious blow by Ninth Tactical Air Force's raid on the Wehrmacht depots at EBRACH and NEUNHEERSEE on 28 March; each of these depots, which supply First and Third US Armies' front, had a capacity of 6,000 tons and were intact and active prior to attack.

What the offensive against oil has meant in terms of enemy operations is strikingly illustrated by the plethora of prisoner of war reports of abandoned vehicles or curtailed armored force vehicular operations due to lack of fuel. Significant documentary evidence has now come to hand in the form of an order issued as far back as 24 January 1945 by RASP, CG of Nineteenth German Army, to the effect that "...Motor fuel is authorized only for tanks, tank retrievers, and essential communication and command vehicles. Everything else must proceed on foot!"

*Eugene L. Harrison*  
EUGENE L. HARRISON

Brigadier General, G. S. C. 12  
A. C. of S., G-2

INCLOSURES

Inc #1 - Enemy Disposition

DISTRIBUTION

"Special"

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**SECRET**  
ENEMY DISPOSITION  
AS OF 31 1200 AM MARCH



**SCALE 1/1,000,000**

0 10 20 30 40 50

200/APR '45/6AG 6074





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HEADQUARTERS 6th US ARMY GROUP  
Office of Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2  
APO 23, U. S. Army

B (Control) P 212  
GROUP 2  
By Authority of  
CG, 6th Army Group  
Initials: *EJH*  
Date: 17 March 1945

INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NUMBER 26  
17 Mar 45  
FOR THE WEEK ENDING

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BY *Norma Koppene*  
ON *15 Jul 76*

1. SUMMARY OF THE ENEMY SITUATION

a. Estimate of the Enemy Situation

The time remaining to Army Group G for its tenure in the SAAR-PALATINATE is rapidly diminishing as a result of the deep penetrations southward from the MOSELLE River to east of BAD KREUZNACH and to BINGEN. The present rate of reinforcements, without hope for any increase, can merely delay the debacle. Threatened breaches in the line will of necessity be reinforced by drawing on the limited available local reserves. The gathering and preservation of manpower along the Western Front must certainly be of the highest priority. A coordinated defense of the east bank of the Rhine River, south of MAINZ, will depend upon the ability of Army Group G to extricate itself from its present predicament.

Army Group G has the unenviable task of supervising two faltering armies, the German Seventh and First. The ability of SS General HAUSSER to maintain his forces intact will receive as supreme a test in the SAAR-PALATINATE as he experienced in the ARGENTAN-FALAISE pocket last summer. The present period has witnessed a transfer of forces from the south, placing more dependence on the SIEGFRIED Line, and the commitment of one of his reserve units in the BAD KREUZNACH area where the obvious mission is to block the drive of U.S. Armored Divisions from cutting his lines of communication far to the rear. The importance of holding our effort in this area in order to protect RHINE crossings must be weighed against the threat existing in the TRIER-MERZIG area, where a concerted Allied effort might very well roll up the MOSELLE River line and outflank the HUNSRUCK Hills.

The Seventh German Army had its right flank pierced to BINGEN-BAD KREUZNACH without having the opportunity to reorganize its forces already badly battered in the EIFEL. Its mission to cover the right flank of First Army appears to be almost beyond possibility of fulfillment. The paucity of troops available was clearly demonstrated by the hasty dispatch of 198 and 559 Infantry Divisions to BAD KREUZNACH in a blocking role. This disposition will offer only a temporary respite as the entire gap created is not possible of cover with forces available. Indications that the enemy failed to appreciate US intentions or strength was illustrated by the sending of 12 SS Mountain Regiment of 6 SS Mountain Division from the DIEBLICH (L 8190) area to the SCHEIDEN (L 2507) area.

The First German Army made obvious its lack of depth at the close of the period by withdrawing its main position into the SIEGFRIED Line. Its mission will be to maintain a secure left flank on the SIEGFRIED Line in order to preserve crossing sites for possible withdrawals across the river. The withdrawal of 559 Infantry Division from east of SAARBRUCKEN into temporary Army or Army Group reserve further weakened its front. The responsibility for the defense of the SIEGFRIED Line between SAARLAUTERN and ZWEIBRUCKEN is known to have been sectionally allocated to divisions presently in the area. The assistance possible to First Army by Fortress and Volkss-turm units is confined to those troops already in the positions. The critical situation developing on its right flank compelled not only the commitment of local reserves but also required aid from its neighbor.

The Nineteenth German Army was reduced to absolute impotence as its last remaining combat division, 198 Infantry, departed on 16 March for the battle area.

b. Capabilities

In the SAAR-PALATINATE the capabilities of the enemy were further restricted by the advance of US forces to the BAD KREUZNACH area. The major question facing the enemy is still the method by which he may get fullest use of the limited forces remaining at his disposal.

The enemy may attempt to establish a defensive line approximately southwest from the bend of the RHINE to the SIEGFRIED Line. A position south from BINGEN along the NAHE River to the vicinity of SAARLAUTERN would have been most favored by terrain, with the north flank dropping gradually south between the MOSELLE and the HUNSRUCK under Allied pressure. The loss of BAD KREUZNACH will force the enemy to anchor the northern flank further south on the RHINE, near WORMS if possible, shortening the base of the defensive triangle. In any case, the road net from KAISERSLAUTERN to the RHINE must be protected as the final avenue for escape.

Execution of this capability will necessarily depend on the enemy's ability to hold his lines. Troops must be spared from the west wall positions in order to strengthen the north flank and the junction of it to the SIEGFRIED Line. There is no doubt that the enemy will eventually be forced across the RHINE, if only because of his inability to reinforce present positions. General HAUSSER can decide how many Germans he wished to leave in our hands west of the RHINE.

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2. 6th US ARMY GROUP FRONT (Saar-Rhine Front)

a. At the close of the period the front lines of enemy forces opposite 6th US Army Group were as follows: VOLKLINGEN (Q 3673), South Bank of SAAR River to BREBACH (Q 4969), BISCHHISHEIM (Q 5169), REICHHEIM (Q 6060), DIETRION (Q 7766), Camp de BITCHE (Q 8051), MOUTERHOUSE (Q 7943), PHILIPPSBOURG (Q 8743), GUMBRECHTSHOFFEN (Q 9234), HAGENAU (R 0424), SCHIRRHOFEN (R 1423), DRUSENHEIM (R 1517), thence South along the Rhine to the SWISS BORDER.

b. ARMY GROUP G (CG: SS GEN HAUSSER)

198 Infantry Division (CO: Col. BARTEL) previously located in the RASTATT area (R 3524), was identified West of BAD KREUZNACH (M 0834) on 16 March. Prisoners stated they had come from the KARLSRUHE area where the division absorbed remnants of 716 Infantry Division. Having had over a month in which to recuperate from its last engagement, the division should be in fair shape by German standards. Its planned reorganization according to the Infantry Division 1945 pattern and its absorption of elements of 708 Volksgrenadier Division have been previously mentioned. Combat infantry strength is tentatively estimated at 2,000.

559 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Brig. Gen. von der MUEHLEN), last identified in its old sector South of SAARBRUCKEN on 12 March, was withdrawn on 14 March and its sector shared by the adjoining 347 and 19 Infantry Divisions. What mission the German Command had envisaged for the division has not been established. In any case, the Allied breakthrough South of the Moselle River forced its commitment South of BAD KREUZNACH at M 0834 on 16 March. Organic combat infantry effectives totalled 1,800.

(1) Seventh German Army (CG: Lt. Gen. FELBER)

2 Panzer Division (CG: LAUCHERT) was not contacted after its withdrawal south of the Moselle. According to an unconfirmed report, a single prisoner (possibly a straggler) was taken in the REMAGEN bridgehead on 16 March. Combat infantry strength is estimated at 1500, supported by approximately 10 tanks.

(a) LXXX Corps (CG: Gen der Inf BAYER)

79 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: ) brought one regiment South from the vic L 3342 to consolidate its remnants in defense of RIOL (L 3233). Identifications were: 208 Grenadier Regiment on 11 March at L 2946, 12 March at L 2828, 226 Grenadier Regiment on 15 March at L 3233. Combat infantry elements do not number more than 750.

212 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: SENSFUSS) was untouched in the clearing of the COCHEM pocket. The division was last identified in position in the area near NEUNAGEN (L 3040) but no identifications were made during this period. It is estimated that 1400 combat infantry effectives still remain.

560 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: BADER) is in the area near BERNKASTEL (L 5348). Indications are that the division was forced to form into battle groups of approximately 100 men each. The only identification made during the period was that of 1130 Grenadier Regiment on 11 March near L 5348. Combat infantry effectives are carried at 500.

9 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: KOLB) has not been contacted since 7 March and is located South of the MOSELLE. A new 36 VOLKSGRENADIER REGIMENT was being formed at WILDFLECHEN (N 59) on 9 March, while remnants of 352 Infantry Division were used to bolster the other regiments. Some replacements were picked up from 2 Panzer Division. The division is believed to have a combat infantry strength of 1000 effectives.

246 Infantry Division (CG: KUEHNE) was retreating East toward the MOSELLE when contacted on 12 March. Identifications include: 404 Grenadier Regiment at L 3765 on 11 March; 352 Grenadier Regiment at L 4450 on 12 March. Its combat infantry effectives total 1400.

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(CG: Gen Lt GRAF von ORIOLA)

159 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Brig. Gen BUERCKY) attempted to hold a line extending along the South bank of the MOSELLE from BURGEN (L 7578) to COCHEM (L 5872). Identifications were 1210 Volksgrenadier Regiment at L 6976 on 11 March; 1211 Volksgrenadier Regiment at L 7280 on 11 March, vic L 7781 on 12 March, at L 7678 on 13 March. Ineffective in its defense, the division has been pocketed by our drives across the river and by the westward expansion of our armored spearhead. Average battalion strength was said to be 250 on 13 March. Combat infantry effectives are estimated at 900.

6 SS Mountain Division (CG: Maj Gen BRENNER) heralded by elements of 506 SS Panzer Grenadier Battalion moved both its regiments to the area East of BRODENBACH (L 7981) about 11 March from vic L 2828. Our attack South of TRIER caused a change of plans and 12 SS Mountain Regiment returned South to SCHEIDEN (L 2705) on 14 March. 11 SS Mountain Regiment was left only to be swept aside by our armored drive. Identifications in the Northern sector were: 11 SS Mountain Regiment at L 8580 and L 8281. Remnants of combat infantry effectives left in this area total approximately 800.

(2) First German Army (CG: Lt Gen OBSTFELDER)

(a) LXXXII Corps (CG: )

General HAHM was relieved of his command by Gen HAUSSER personally and an SS officer is stated to have taken his place. The Corps continued to hold a sector from East of TRIER (L 2827) to North of MERZIG (L 1900). The disposition of its divisions remained substantially unchanged with remnants of 256 Volksgrenadier Division holding the northern sector, 2 Mountain Division the central and remnants of 416 Infantry Division the Southern portion of the sector. Toward the end of the period 12 SS Mountain Regt of 6 SS Mountain Division was identified in support of the impotent 416 Infantry Division.

256 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Brig Gen FRANZ) consolidated its remnants into several small battle groups that lack any semblance to a divisional organization. They were supported by some small, static units. This conglomeration managed to put up a fair defense against Allied attacks. Combat infantry strength of divisional remnants does not exceed 500.

2 Mountain Division (CG: Brig Gen UTZ) weakened by several abortive counterattacks without sufficient heavy weapon support, was forced to give way to continued pressure in the SCHWARZWALDER HOCHWALD region. Both organic regiments were identified on 13 March. Combat infantry effectives total 1,000.

416 Infantry Division (CG: Maj Gen PFLEGER) was also forced to withdraw its much battered remnants. An indication as to the importance the enemy attached to the divisional area (North of MERZIG) is gleaned from the fact that both 12 SS Mountain Regiment of 6 SS Mountain Division and at least one battalion (III Bn 38 SS PCR) of 17 SS Panzer Grenadier Division were committed in the SCHEIDEN (L 2705) area. Remainder of 416 Infantry Division is estimated at 600 combat infantry effectives. Attachments increase the total to 2000.

(b) LXXXV Corps (CG: Lt Gen KNISS)

719 Infantry Division (CG: Brig Gen GAEDE) was more fortunate than the division on its flank. Protected by strong SIEGFRIED defenses on the East bank of the SAAR, the division remained in only loose contact. The identification of 719 Field Replacement Battalion at R 3075 on 13 March suggests that the division was obliged to extend its sector to the South and now holds from L 1900 to VOLKLINGEN (Q 3175). Combat infantry strength is 2,000.

347 Infantry Division (CG: Maj Gen TRIERENBERG) had to extend its sector to the East, taking over some of the area vacated by 559 Volksgrenadier Division. 347 Division withdrew to SIEGFRIED Line positions along the north bank of the SAAR, abandoning its bridgehead South of that river. The sector now extends from VOLKLINGEN (Q 3175) through SAARBRUCKEN (Q 4770). 860, 861, 880 Grenadier Regiments,

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347 Artillery Regiment, and 347 Engineer Battalion were identified in this area on 14 and 15 March. The organic combat infantry strength total of 1,300 is raised to 1,600 by attachment of 12 LANDESSCHUETZEN Battalion.

(c) XIII Corps (CG: Maj Gen MAX SIMON)

19 Infantry Division (CG: Brig Gen BRITZELMAYR) expanded to the West to take over responsibility for the Eastern portion of the sector vacated by 559 Volksgrenadier Division. 19 Infantry Division now holds from exclusive SAAR-BRUCKEN (Q 4770) to Q 5862. The division is in poor shape and was unable to prevent one penetration to the SIEGFRIED Line at Q 5471 on 16 March. On 15 March, 73 Grenadier Regiment was identified at Q 5067 and Q 5166; 74 Grenadier Regiment, 119 Anti-Tank and Engineer Battalions at Q 5364; 719 Artillery Regiment at Q 5266. 59 Grenadier Regiment has not been contacted since its destruction on 23 February. Elements of 18 Werfer Brigade are operating in the divisional area as 21 Werfer Regiment was met at Q 5567 on 15 March. 17 SS Assault Gun Battalion, previously reported as operating under 19 Division, has returned to its parent unit. Though 200 replacements were received from the division combat school on 12 March, combat infantry effectives do not total more than 1,200.

17 SS Panzer Grenadier Division (CO: SS Col KLINGENBERG) put up a determined defense but had to withdraw slightly under strong pressure. It now holds from Q 5862 to Q 7559. Last identifications (15 March) were: 37 SS Panzer Grenadier Regiment at Q 6457 and Q 6956; 38 SS Panzer Grenadier Regiment at Q 6556; 17 SS Engineer Battalion at Q 5957; 17 SS Reconnaissance Battalion at Q 5661; 17 SS Assault Gun Battalion at Q 6858. III Battalion 38 SS Panzer Grenadier Regiment was contacted at SCHEIDEN (L 2705) on 14 March, indicating that the enemy failed to appreciate our intentions. It appears that Volkstrum men were used to release some divisional service personnel for combat duty. This expedient raised division combat strength by about 300. However, recent losses and the detachment of one battalion effected a reduction of overall strength to 1,900 combat infantry effectives.

(d) XC Corps (CG: )

16 Volksgrenadier Division (CO: Col. MOECKEL) put up only spotty resistance against our attack and was unable to prevent the capture of BITCHE. The division is responsible for the line from Q 7559 to Q 8442. On 15 March the following identifications were made: 221 Volksgrenadier Regiment at Q 8037, 223 Volksgrenadier Regiment at Q 7441, 225 Volksgrenadier Regiment at Q 7549. 16 Fusilier Battalion was contacted at Q 7842 on 16 March. The attached I Battalion of 935 Volksgrenadier Regiment was identified at Q 7467 on 17 March. Casualties lowered the divisional combat infantry strength to 1,900 including the two attached battalions formerly part of 245 Infantry Division.

36 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Brig Gen WELIM) proved to be thinly spread in its sector from Q 8442 to Q 9133. Resistance was scattered and fairly light. The following identifications were made on 15 March: 118 Volksgrenadier Regiment, 268 Artillery Regiment, and 36 Engineer Battalion at Q 8830; 87 Volksgrenadier Regiment at Q 8536. It was determined during the period that II Battalion 36 Replacement Regiment, the disposition of which had been vague, was absorbed by 118 Volksgrenadier Regiment. Allowing for casualties, present combat infantry strength is 1,800.

(e) LXXXIX Corps (CG: Lt Gen HOEHNE)

47 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Maj Gen BORK) was taken by surprise by our recent attack. I Battalion 103 Volksgrenadier Regiment was captured intact and their reaction to the attack was generally confused. At week's end the division held from Q 9133 to R 0224. Last identifications, made on 15 March, were: 103 Volksgrenadier Regiment at Q 9229, 104 Volksgrenadier Regiment at Q 9527, 47 Fusilier Battalion and 147 Anti-Tank Battalion at Q 8929. The identification of the Fusilier Battalion is of particular interest inasmuch as it points to reorganization of the division in accordance with the Table of Organization for the Infantry Division 1945. Deducting known losses, combat infantry effectives total 1,500.

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457 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Brig Gen SEIDEL) resisted with determination and gave ground only under strong pressure in its sector from R 0224 to R 1423. Identifications made on 15 March were: 466 and 477 Volksgrenadier Regiments and 257 Artillery Regiment at R 0920. 457 Volksgrenadier Regiment and 257 Fusilier Company at R 0420; I Battalion 2 SS Police Regiment (attached) at R 0623. Combat infantry strength now amounts to 1,800 including 200 for attachments.

905 Mobilization Division (CG: ) now holds the sector from R 1423 to the Rhine. Contact in this area was generally light and the only identification made during the period was of 905 Fusilier Company at R 0920 on 15 March. The constitution of such an organic auxiliary unit may be a forerunner to an upgrading of the division as in the case of 405 Reserve Division. Combat infantry strength is still carried at 800 on line and 500 along the East bank of the RHINE or in reserve.

(3) Nineteenth German Army (CG: Lt Gen RASP)

By this time Nineteenth Army has lost all the major units under its command while in the COLMAR Pocket. It may very well be that the Army staff remains in the Black Forest to assume operational command of the units along the RHINE in the event of an Allied crossing, thus complementing the OBERRHEIN Defense Command's administrative functions. In any case, it is obviously an Army staff which C in C West has in reserve, whose ultimate disposition is not yet clear.

716 Infantry Division (CO: Col HAFNER), last reported in the KEHL (W 0596) area, was stated by prisoners of 198 Infantry Division to have been absorbed by that division. Though the division's rehabilitation in the future is a possibility, it can be written off for the present.

(a) LXIV Corps (Lt Gen THUMM)

The Corps continues to be responsible for a portion of the SIEGFRIED Line in the STRASBOURG area.

(b) XVIII SS Corps (CG: SS Lt Gen REINEFARTH)

No change in status or location.

(4) DEFENSE COMMAND OBERRHEIN (CG: SS Lt Gen MAUR)

No Change Reported.

405 Reserve Division (CG: Maj Gen SEEGER) remains in positions along the Rhine, north and south of KEHL (W 0596).

805 Mobilization Division (CG: Brig Gen von OPPEN). Prisoner of war statement that General von OPPEN commands this division confirms previous indications that the division was identical with the Divisional Group "NEUF BRISACH". 291 Penal Battalion (zbV) was identified in the divisional sector, but its relation to the division is not known.

1005 Brigade Staff (CO: ) remains North of LORRACH (A 9590) controlling 7 Grenadier Regiment OBERRHEIN and some still unidentified units.

(5). Twenty- Fourth Army (CG: SS Lt Gen HANS SCHMIDT)

No change reported.

(6) 600 Infantry Division (Russian) is still carried at MUNSINGEN. There has been no recent identifications or confirmation of its location.

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(7) ENEMY STRENGTH OPPOSITE 6th ARMY GROUP (SAAR-PALATINATE-RHINE Front)

Divisional Units in Contact and Reserve:  
Combat Infantry Effectives)

Saar - Palatinate Front

First Army	12,500
Seventh Army	13,500
Rhine Front	4,000
	<u>30,000</u>

Reserves: (Estimated)

Saar-Palatinate	- - -
Black Forest	<u>1,000 - 1,500</u>

T O T A L 31,000 - 31,500

Artillery Guns:

Saar-Palatinate	950
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Tanks and SP Guns:

Saar - Palatinate	135 - 155
Saar - Palatinate (Reserve)	35 - 45
Rhine River Front	<u>10 - 10</u>

T O T A L 180 - 210

3. 6th US ARMY GROUP FRONT (Alpine Front)

At the close of the period the enemy front lines opposite the 6th US Army Group on the Alpine Front were as follows: CHAMONIX (C 4728), MT ROSELETTE (Z 4091), BOURG ST MAURICE (Z 4680), VILLAROGIER (H 4692), BESSANS (H 5260), MT TABOR (K 3522), BRIANCON (P 3898), CHATEAU QUEYRAS (P 5382), GUILLESTRE (P 4170), BARCELONETTE (P 4341), ISOLA (N 4635), ST MARTIN (N 6020), GRIMALDI (S 8088).

a. Enemy Dispositions.

Italians units, interspersed with the remaining elements of 5 Mountain Division, now man the bulk of the positions on the front. Of the German units, 100 Mountain Regiment Elements are confirmed in positions at MONT CENIS (H 4565), and BARDONNECHIA (K 8418). A new replacement battalion has been added to the forces of 85 Mountain Regiment East of AIGUILLES (H 4603). Prisoners of war state that the entire LITTORIO Division has been accounted for holding positions along a sector of the front. In the coastal sector, 34 Infantry is still in control. However, 80 Infantry Regiment has not yet returned from its Anti-Partisan activities North of IMPERIA. A possible indication of some future movement from the area was the observation of large numbers of stationary railroad cars on sidings between CUNEO (N 8655) and BRA (O 1485), early in the period.

b. General

The increase in the number of patrols and attempts at ambushing friendly patrols in the Northern sector confirms the enemy's extreme anxiety concerning our present activities and future intentions. This anxiety was also shown earlier in the period in the Southern sector of the Alpine Front. There are as yet no definite indications of German withdrawals from the Franco-Italian border.

4. OPERATIONS

RHINE FRONT

The enemy continued his nuisance raids over the RHINE River without any greater success than he experienced in the past period. Early in the period, a minor enemy infiltration was repulsed in the WANTZENAU (R 0706) area. Of particular interest was the area near W 0489 where a series of enemy landing attempts were frustrated on March 11 after he had previously tried to put patrols across the river just south

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of that point. Artillery fire was generally light and scattered throughout the period.

#### SAAR-PALATINATE FRONT

During the period preceding the Allied attack on 15 March, the enemy demonstrated no particular activity. Friendly patrols encountered a normally alert enemy all along the line. West of the HARDT Mountains, several enemy patrols averaging about 25 men in strength were easily repulsed without their having accomplished any positive results. However, the enemy's main anxiety was obviously in the HAGUENAU area, where our patrols met intense all weapons fire.

On 12 March, an Allied limited objective attack to enlarge the MODER bridgehead caused immediate reaction with a relatively strong but unsuccessful counterattack coming on the night of 13 March. Still appreciating the major Allied threat to be in the HAGUENAU area, a gradual withdrawal was effected west of the HARDT under cover of heavily mined terrain and continuous sniper fire. 559 Volksgrenadier Division and elements of 17 SS Division were released from their positions on the line.

The Allied attack beginning early on 15 March evidently achieved complete tactical surprise. Light to moderate resistance, spotty contact, and numerous thick mine fields canalizing friendly maneuver characterized the opening phase. Our secondary attack met determined resistance, as had been expected, in the CAMP D'OBERHOFFEN (R 0821) area while 257 Division fought a house-to-house retreat in HAGUENAU. After having been initially driven back, both 47 and 36 Divisions rallied to counterattack unsuccessfully with armor in support. BITCHE was bypassed on the north and subsequently entered without opposition, as 16 Division withdrew. 17 SS Division, which was engaged in releasing some units from the line, was able to offer only light resistance before it retreated to its prepared positions. Its Assault Gun battalion continued to carry out its general support role by covering forward positions during the withdrawal, with strong effort at WEISKIRCH (Q 7157) and VOIMUNSTER (Q 7259).

Between the valley of the BLIES and SAARBRUCKEN, Allied tactical surprise was counterbalanced by strongly prepared defensive positions, based on towns and strongpoints screened by extensive minefields. The initial impetus of the attack was absorbed only at the cost of sacrificing the enemy garrisons obviously left to cushion the blow, while the bulk of the enemy forces sought the protection of the SIEGFRIED Line.

At the close of the period, all indications pointed to a general withdrawal all along the line into the WestWall. Artillery fire became sporadic as both air reconnaissance and prisoners reported enemy columns moving hastily back. By noon of 17 March, enemy opposition was apparently disintegrating and the outer defenses of the SIEGFRIED Line were already being penetrated.

#### ALPINE FRONT

The enemy was particularly active in the northern and central sectors. Friendly patrols were ambushed near BRIANCON (P 3998) and LANSLEBOURG (Z 5241). At MONT BLANC (C 4723) and PETIT ST. BERNARD (C 4500) enemy groups were observed working on defenses. Artillery fire was only scattered in the coastal area. Otherwise the usual quiet prevailed along the entire front.

#### ATLANTIC FRONT

Enemy patrols were normally active in the La ROCHELLE zone. One unsuccessful attempt was made to encircle a friendly OP East of LA PREUILLE (T 4724). Some concentrations of troops, and supplies, were reported in areas T 3844 - 4538. At ROYAN light machine gun fire was received in the vicinity of Y 4772 and enemy artillery was reported in the area of Y 4773. Some water activity was noted for on 14 March an enemy boat approached CHAPUS (T 2901) and fired several volleys. In addition an enemy tug towing a barge was attacked northwest of ILE D'AIX by a friendly ship which forced the abandonment and capture of the barge.

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Movements consisted of heavy traffic in the ST. VIVIEN (Y 3653) vicinity and foot troops moving in the area of Y 3751. In addition, some enemy traffic between PANISSAS Y 3751 and GAYAC was observed on 14 March.

## 5. COMMUNICATIONS

### A. Tactical Reconnaissance

Observations during the period were facilitated by excellent weather and extensive cover. Rail movement within the Black Forest area and in the Saar Palatinate were on a small scale. However, moderate to heavy activity was observed in the eastern Rhine Valley and on the rail lines, MOSBACH (0385) - STUTTGART. Much road activity was seen in the areas STUTTGART - KARLSRUHE - RASTATT - OFFENBURG - FREUDENSTADT, and in the SAAR - PALATINATE.

On 14 March, 21 scattered trains were seen throughout the Black Forest moving in all directions. There were also moderately heavy loadings in the FREIBURG marshalling yards on the same day. On 14, 15, and 16 March a total of four large vehicular convoys and groups of horse drawn transport were observed moving in a northward direction from the area RASTATT - OFFENBURG - FREUDENSTADT. This indicated that a possible major military move was under way from this region.

There was a military train reported at PFORZHEIM on 10 March and another on 15 March. In addition, some 90 flats loaded with motor transport or tanks were observed in the DURLACH (R 5345) area. Further to the north limited military activity was reported at HEIDELBERG and DARMSTADT. The moderately heavy rail activity observed on the north-south line through HEILBRONN revealed limited military activity with one military train sighted at LUDWIGSBURG on 15 March. The trend of traffic on this line was north in the direction of ASCHAFFENBURG.

Except for the 3 loaded military rakes observed in the ST WENDEL area on 13 March, military rail activity in the SAAR - PALATINATE was negligible throughout the period. An accumulation of rolling stock was noted in the western Rhine Valley on 16 March, especially in the yards at LANDAU, NEUSTADT, and EDENKOBEN (R 2877). In direct contrast to the rail movement, the road activity was very pronounced throughout the period. There were strong indications of enemy withdrawals to points north of the SIEGFRIED Line on 13 - 16 March inclusive, and it appeared that the movements from SAARLAUTERN - PIRMASENS areas had ZWEIBRUCKEN as their focal point. On 16 March, a 300 vehicle convoy was moving East from BINGEN just prior to the arrival of US forces on the NAHE River. There was also a trend of vehicular movement towards crossings of the Rhine River from area LANDAU - BAD DURKHEIM on the same day.

Pontoon and ferry activity continue along the Rhine between DRUSENHEIM and KARLSRUHE and reports of 16 March show that many of the bridges and crossings along the river are protected by an increased number of barrage balloons.

### B. Status of Communications

The Third Army's sudden drive to BAD MUNSTER has cut off the north-south line from KAISERSLAUTERN to BINGEN and in addition threatens the route from KAISERSLAUTERN to WORMS. With the one RUDESHEIM rail bridge unserviceable, it is evident that the enemy's communications net in this area has received a telling blow. At the present time it appears that the east-west line from NEUNKIRCHEN through KAISERSLAUTERN is the only main line left to the enemy in the SAAR. However, previous bombings throughout this area have so weakened the lines and taxed the repair facilities of the Germans that it is extremely difficult for the enemy to repair the lines properly in order to move trains along the lines still remaining in his hands in the Saar. East of the Rhine, persistent cutting of lines leading from KARLSRUHE continues to slow down the movement of trains along the Rhine Valley.

### INCLOSURES

- #1 Inc - The Rhine Bridges
- #2 Inc - Enemy Disposition

### DISTRIBUTION

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# THE RHINE BRIDGES



## -KEY-

- PERMANENT ROAD BRIDGE
- FLOATING ROAD BRIDGE
- RAIL BRIDGE
- FERRY BRIDGE
- COMBINATION HIGHWAY-RAIL BRIDGE
- FERRY IN OPERATION

BRIDGE UNDER CONSTRUCTION

171200 AMARCH  
ENCL. #1 TO  
WEEKLY INTELL.  
SUM. #26

G-2 6TH ARMY GROUP  
SCALE: 1/500,000

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**ENEMY DISPOSITION**  
**AS OF 171200 A MARCH**

G-2 6TH ARMY GROUP  
ENCL.#2 TO  
WEEKLY INTELL. SUM.#26







**DECLASSIFIED**HEADQUARTERS 6th US ARMY GROUP  
Office of the A. C. of S., G-2  
APO 23, U. S. Army

.....  
 :By Authority of :  
 :CG, 6th Army Group :  
 :Initials: :  
 :Date: 10 March 1945:  
 :.....

WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NUMBER 25FOR THE WEEK ENDING 10 MARCH 1945

M.I.R.S.

1. SUMMARY OF THE ENEMY SITUATIONa. Estimate of the Enemy Situation

The collapse of German forces in the north has left Army Group G the only higher echelon with units on the west bank of the Rhine River. The consideration which it should receive in the allocation of reinforcements in order to carry out the mission of holding the SAAR-PALATINATE is radically tempered by the dearth of reserves available, the demands of the REMAGEN bridgehead and the ominous threat to the RUHR and WESTPHALIA. Army Group G maintained a thinly manned line by the constant shuffling of its limited forces without even the possibility of reserves.

Army Group G will probably assume responsibility for all German forces in the SAAR-PALATINATE. Its mission will be to maintain the integrity of this command, with withdrawals carried out only on the threat of annihilation. The hasty commitment of 159 Volksgrenadier Division just south of KOBLENZ and the obviously rescue mission in the same area of 6 SS Mountain Division, immediately after completion of a similar role south of TRIER, points to the enemy's appreciation of the gravity of the situation along the Moselle. The strategic defensive position of Army Group G has been greatly jeopardized by the collapse of Seventh Army lines in the EIFFEL and the Siegfried positions in the First Army area will no longer be an asset but rather a liability if the Moselle River is crossed from the north because of the necessary immobility of fortress troops.

First German Army continues to decline progressively in regard to quality and quantity of troops under its command. 49 Volksgrenadier Division, which made a brief appearance one week ago, disappeared as surreptitiously as it had appeared. While 2 Mountain Division continues to hold successfully the pivot town of ZERF (L 2312) in the SIEGFRIED Line where it had gone as a stop gap formation, 6 SS Mountain Division continues its tour of the SAAR-PALATINATE. Upon its departure from the HARDT Mountains on 28 February, the division appeared on the right flank of 2 Mountain Division for a few days, but was later sent to hold the line on the Moselle River at CARDEN (L 6876).

The move of 17 SS Panzer Grenadier Division's Assault Gun Battalion from the divisional sector to the SAARBRUCKEN area in order to provide armour support against aggressive Allied actions has been characteristic of the patchwork solutions resorted to by the enemy to counteract local penetrations and undue pressure. Further manifestation of the enemy's anxiety was the alert reception which friendly patrols met in the area from the HARDT Mountains to the Rhine River.

Nineteenth German Army no longer poses the threat of an offensive action since five of its eight nominal divisions (2 Mtn, 16 VG, 159 VG, 189 VG and 338 Inf Divs) and 106 Panzer Brigade have departed from the Black Forest. 708 Volksgrenadier Division has also been destroyed by cannibalization by 198 and 416 Infantry Divisions. While the remaining two divisions (716 and 198 Inf Divs) remain unaccounted for, it is believed that 716 Infantry Division is also leaving the Black Forest for a more active sector of the front. Thus, with the increasing duties of Army Group G in the SAAR-PALATINATE, it appears unlikely that Nineteenth Army would be carried as a responsibility of Army Group G. The enemy obviously appreciates a defensive attitude by the Allies along the Upper Rhine River and hence would be giving a single Army Group commander the responsibility for coordinating two distinct types of operations.

b. Capabilities

The advance of Allied forces to the Rhine has even more completely restricted Army Group G to a strictly defensive capability. In the execution of this capability it can hold only temporarily on the Moselle and the SIEGFRIED Line because of the absolute dependency of these positions on each other for mutual support. The penetration of the one would leave the forces on the other in immediate danger of attack from the rear, if not of complete encirclement. In such an eventuality, the enemy must consider the saving of his troops of prime necessity, outweighing even the protection of the SAAR-PALATINATE. If he wishes to live to fight another day, the enemy must choose to fight and surrender.

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2. 6th US ARMY GROUP (FRONT Saar-Rhine Front)

a. At the close of the period the front lines of enemy forces opposite 6th US Army Group were as follows: VOLKINGEN (Q 3573), ST ARNOLD (Q 4667), RIMLING (Q 6555), HOTTVILLE (Q 7253), ALTHORN (Q 7640), PFAFFENHOFFEN (Q 9027), DRUSENHEIM (R 1517), thence South along the Rhine to the Swiss border.

b. ARMY GROUP G (CG: SS Gen. HAUSSER)

(1) First German Army (CG: Lt. Gen. OBSTFELDER)

The increasing threat in the TRIER area, the depleted condition of 416 Infantry and 256 Volksgrenadier Divisions, the deteriorating condition on Seventh German Army front, compelled the First German Army to make further changes in its disposition in order to strengthen its right flank.

The 6 SS Mountain Division was committed south of TRIER on 6 March, between 2 Mountain and 256 Volksgrenadier Divisions. However, at the end of the period the 2 Mountain Division was reported extending its sector to the north, while the 6 SS Mountain Division was being withdrawn to be recommitted probably in the Moselle area.

Remnants of the 245 Infantry Division were absorbed by 16 Volksgrenadier Division and Divisional as well as 935 Grenadier Regimental Staffs were withdrawn about 26 February to Germany presumably to complete the reformation of a new division.

Considering that the First Army is left without any major unit in immediate reserve, which is badly needed on account of the thinly held front lines, the 198 Infantry Division may move into the Saar-Palatinate as Army reserve.

6 SS Mountain Division "NORD" (CG: SS Maj. Gen. BRENNER) in First Army reserve last week, was committed on 6 March in the area south of TRIER, at which place 11 and 12 SS Mountain Regiments have been identified. The commitment of the division in that sector strengthened the depleted units on both flanks, (2 Mtn. and 256 VG Divs) as its 3,200 combat infantry effectives are capable of a strong defense action. However, the deteriorating situation in the north induced the enemy to withdraw the division at the end of the period for commitment in an area more immediately threatened.

(a) LXXXII Corps (CG: )

Due to the general state of flux of the divisions in this Corps area, it is difficult to establish precise divisional boundaries. The Corps holds a line from South-East of TRIER (L 2827) to North of MERZIG (L 1900). The disposition of divisions from north to south is as follows: 256 Volksgrenadier Division, 2 Mountain Division and 416 Infantry Division.

6 SS Mountain Division is believed to have withdrawn from the Corps zone to the north and east of its former positions. The failure to identify further elements of 49 Infantry Division in the corps area suggests that either additional divisional units are being kept in reserve or do not, in fact, exist.

256 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Brig. Gen. FRANZ) was forced to keep its remnants in line South-East of TRIER. 481 Volksgrenadier Regiment and several auxiliary units were identified on 6 March. The division's combat infantry effectives amount to about 500.

2 Mountain Division (CG: Brig. Gen. UTZ) proved itself aggressive despite its depleted ranks. Originally south of 6 SS Mountain Division, this division extended its sector to the north at the end of the period to provide for the withdrawal of 6 SS Mountain Division. The division staged several spirited counterattacks in the ZERF (L 2412) area. Combat infantry strength totals 1,000.

416 Infantry Division (CG: Maj. Gen. PFLIEGER) is being held in line despite its virtual annihilation. The division can be considered only in terms of remnants. Even with converted service troops, not more than 700 combat infantry effectives are believed to remain.

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(b) LXXXV Corps (CG: Lt. Gen. KNISS)

719 Infantry Division (CG: Brig. Gen. GAEDE) continued to hold defenses from L 1900 to SAARLAUTERN (Q 2880). Contact during the week was very light; consequently new identifications are lacking. According to revised estimates received, division combat infantry strength is lowered to 2,000.

347 Infantry Division (CG: Maj. Gen. TRIERENBERG) stubbornly resisted all attacks in the FORBACH (Q 4066) area, but later in the period the division lost its toehold on the northern part of the town. Its present sector extends from SAARLAUTERN (Q 2880) to Q 4168. Last identifications were: 860 Grenadier Regiment, 6 March at Q 3768; 861 Grenadier Regiment, 4 March at Q 3172 and Q 3966; 880 Grenadier Regiment, 6 March at Q 3768; 347 Fusilier and Replacement Battalion, 5 March at Q 4068; 347 Anti-Tank Battalion, 5 March at Q 3767; 347 Engineer Battalion, 4 March at Q 4167. Losses during recent engagements were considerable. Combat infantry strength now does not exceed 1,400. 400 is added for 12 Landes-schuetzin Battalion and the newly committed Alarm Companies HAHN and HESSE.

(c) XIII SS Corps (CG: Maj. Gen. MAX SIMON)

559 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Brig. Gen. von der MUEHLEN) remained in its sector from north-east of FORBACH (Q 4168) to the Saar River at Q 4966. Identifications here were: I Battalion 1125 Volksgrenadier Regiment at Q 4168 on 8 March; 1126 Volksgrenadier Regiment at Q 4470 and Q 4168 on 4 March; 1127 Volksgrenadier Regiment has been out of contact since 26 February. I Battalion 1125 Volksgrenadier Regiment is operating under 1126 Regiment while the 1125 staff is said to be in the TRIER area, forming a new regiment March Battalion IX, totaling 300 men, arrived at SAARBRUCKEN 1 March. Though originally destined to become II Battalion 1125 Regiment, it was used as a general replacement unit for the division. No additional information was available this week concerning the utilization of Volkssturm personnel as reinforcements for this division. 559 Volksgrenadier put up a determined though costly defense for SAARBRUCKEN against our attacks on 3-4 March. Combat infantry effectives total 2,300 men including attached units.

19 Infantry Division (CG: Brig. Gen. BRITZELMAYR) kept its old sector which extended from the Saar River (Q 4966) to Q 5560, while the division continued its defensive attitude, the following identifications were made: 73 Grenadier Regiment at Q 5165 on 6 March; 74 Grenadier Regiment at Q 5266 on 3 March; 119 Engineer Battalion at Q 5564 on 4 March; 19 Replacement Battalion at Q 4966 on 7 March; 59 Grenadier Regiment apparently has not yet been reconstituted in accordance with previously reported plans. 119 Labor Battalion, composed of 300 unreliable foreigners and their German guards, was attached to the Engineer Battalion. Several alarm companies, formed from the Division Combat Schools have been sent into line as Battle Group BEUTNER. Two companies of 17 SS Assault Gun Battalion were identified operating in 19 Division territory. Combat infantry aggregate, including the alarm units, is estimated at 1,300.

17 SS Panzer Grenadier Division (CO: SS Col. KLINGENBERG) made use of the quiet that prevailed in its zone (Q 5560 - Q 7354) to continue its reorganization and improvement of positions. Identifications made were: 38 SS Panzer Grenadier Regiment at Q 6157 and Q 6456 on 8 March; 37 SS Panzer Grenadier Regiment at Q 7256 on 5 March. A Battalion SACHS, composed of personnel drawn from the divisional services, was also contacted on 8 March at Q 5956. III Battalion 38 SS Panzer Grenadier Regiment has been reformed. Prisoners mentioned that, in the absence of the Assault Gun Battalion (identified at Q 5065 on 4 March in 19 Division sector), amplifiers were used extensively to simulate the sounds of moving armor in the divisional area. Combat infantry strength is carried at 2,100. Indications were evident that increased anti-gas precautions are being taken.

(d) XC Corps (CG: )

16 Volksgrenadier Division (CO: Col. MOECKEL) has in addition command of units which were previously part of 245 Division and are now located on the right flank of its divisional sector. Consequently, the divisional area now extends from Q 7354 to Q 8036. Last identifications were as follows: 221 Volksgrenadier Regiment at Q 7738 on 9 March; 223 Volksgrenadier Regiment at Q 7541 on 9 March; 225 Volksgrenadier Regiment at Q 7547 on 7 March; 16 Fusilier Battalion at Q 7540 on 6 March; Battle Group LUETZE (remnants 937 Grenadier Regiment) at Q 7451 on 6 March;

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and I Battalion 935 Grenadier Regiment at Q 7354 on 4 March. It appears that I Battalion 935 Grenadier Regiment and Battle Group LUTZE are all that remains of the 245 Volksgrenadier Division. The staffs of the division and its units, according to prisoners, have returned to Germany. Aside from controlling these remnants, 16 Division has made use of all available sources to rebuild its line units. In addition to the incorporated Battalion MORG from 905 Mobilization Division, remnants of 189 Volksgrenadier Division were also absorbed. This was confirmed by prisoners from 223 Volksgrenadier Regiment who stated that remnants of 1212, 1213, and 1214 Volksgrenadier Regiments made up II Battalion 223 Volksgrenadier Regiment and that only the staff and cadre of 189 Division went to the COLOGNE area. Other replacements came from service units, air force, and the navy. As a result, the divisional combat infantry strength was increased to 2,100 including attached units.

36 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Brig. Gen. WELLM) spent a generally quiet week in the sector Q 8036 to Q 9027. Only identifications made during the period were as follows: 87 Grenadier Regiment at Q 8236 and 118 Grenadier Regiment at Q 8928 on 8 March and 165 Grenadier Regiment at Q 8434 on 4 March. Further disposition of the previously reported Replacement Regiment was indicated by the conversion of I Battalion into I Battalion 87 Grenadier Regiment. The disposition of II Battalion of the Replacement Regiment remains uncertain. Combat infantry strength is estimated at 2,000.

(e) LXXXIX Corps (CG: Lt. Gen. HOEHNE)

47 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Maj. Gen. BORK) extended slightly to the west and now holds from Q 9027 to immediately west of HAGUENAU (R 0224). There was no indication during the period that the division would move to the BITCHE area as was previously planned according to prisoners statements. Units identified were: 104 Volksgrenadier Regiment at Q 9328 on 7 March; 115 Volksgrenadier Regiment at Q 9825 on 8 March. 103 Volksgrenadier Regiment has been out of contact since 1 March. Losses suffered during the period were negligible and combat infantry effectives total 1,700.

257 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Brig. Gen. SEIDEL) continued to hold the line from HAGUENAU (R 0224) to OBERHOFFEN (R 0920). Activity was practically at a stand still, resulting in a complete lack of identifications of organic units during the period. A prisoner of war taken on 2 March stated that 3-400 men remained in the Field Replacement Battalion. The integration of these men into the weakened regiments may be expected. I Battalion 2 SS Police Regiment was again identified in the division zone on 6 March at R 0622. Battle Groups HARTIG and HELDMANN are still accepted as attached to the division. Organic combat infantry strength is estimated at approximately 1,900, while attached units raise this figure to 2,300.

905 Mobilization Division (CG: ) is responsible for the sector from R 0920 to the Rhine River. Regiment MARBACH was identified on 1 March east of OBERHOFFEN and a deserter from 51 German Air Force Battalion was taken at R 1222 on 9 March, suggesting the battalions presence in this area. Combat infantry strength estimate remains unchanged at 800 on line and 500 in reserve or in positions on the east bank of the Rhine.

(2) Nineteenth German Army (CG: Lt. Gen. RASP)

The critical situation that has developed on the Western Front north of the Moselle River during the past thirty days has siphoned all but two nominal divisions from the Nineteenth Army. Only 198 Infantry Division at RASTATT (R 3528) and 716 Infantry Division remain in BADEN.

106 Panzer Brigade was identified on 3 March in the vicinity of COLOGNE. However, its armour was not contacted. 708 Volksgrenadier Division is reported to have been cannibalized by 198 Infantry and 416 Infantry Divisions. 159 Volksgrenadier Division was contacted in the area north of the Moselle River at KAIL (L 6576).

159 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Brig. Gen. BUERCKY) was identified on 10 March in the vicinity of KAIL (L 6576). Prisoners were taken from II Battalion 1210 Grenadier Regiment and a captured map established the existence of I Battalion. Prisoners of war also state that the remainder of the division was to follow from the neighborhood of the Swiss border. The division was last located in the FREIBURG - TUTTLINGEN area. Its combat infantry effectives are not very large.

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708 Volksgrenadier Division (CO: Col. BLECKWENN). Elements of the division have been absorbed by both 198 Infantry and 416 Infantry Divisions. Prisoners of war yielded by 416 Infantry Division stated that they were reinforcements from 748 Volksgrenadier Regiment. It appears that the staffs of the division have been left behind and are to be entrusted with the rehabilitation of the division at a later date.

(a) LXIV Corps (CG: Lt. Gen. THUMM)

198 Infantry Division (CO: Col. BARTEL) has moved to the vicinity of RASTATT (R 3524) from the area east of OFFENBURG (W 1585). Elements of 708 Volksgrenadier Division are reported to have been absorbed by 198 Infantry Division. Combat infantry strength is tentatively estimated at 1,500.

716 Infantry Division (CO: Col. HAFNER). No new information regarding the divisions location has been received. Last carried in the KEHL (W 0596) region, its northward move is a distinct probability. Tentative estimate of combat effectives is 1,200.

(b) XVIII SS Corps (CG: SS Lt. Gen. REINEFARTH)

Its location and operational status remain unchanged.

c. DEFENSE COMMAND OBERRHEIN (CG: SS Lt. Gen. MAUR)

Status unchanged.

405 Reserve Division (CG: Maj. Gen. SEEGER) continues to man defenses along the Rhine, north and south of KEHL (W 0596).

30 SS Grenadier Division (CO: Col. SIEGLING). Due to complete lack of information over a period of more than a month the division is no longer carried in the Black Forest area.

805 Mobilization Division (CG: ) is still responsible for SIEGFRIED positions along the Rhine north of BRISACH.

1005 Brigade Staff (CO: ). Controlling 7th Grenadier Regiment OBERRHEIN and other as yet unidentified units, is holding Rhine defenses north of LORRACH (A 9590) with headquarters in the vicinity of NEUENBERG (V 8713).

d. TWENTY-FOURTH ARMY (CG: SS Lt. Gen. HANS SCHMIDT)

No change.

e. 600 Infantry Division (Russian) is still carried at MUNSINGEN pending further clarification.

f. ENEMY STRENGTH OPPOSITE 6th US ARMY GROUP (Saar-Palatinate-Rhine Front)

Divisional Units in Contact and Reserve:  
Combat Infantry Effectives)

Saar - Palatinate Front	17,000
Rhine Front	4,000

Reserves: (Estimated)

Saar - Palatinate Front	-----
Black Forest	2-3,000

T O T A L	23-24,000
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Artillery Guns:

Saar - Palatinate	500
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Tanks and SP Guns:

Saar - Palatinate	125-135
Saar - Palatinate ( Reserve )	55- 65

Rhine River Front

T O T A L

19,200

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5. 6th US ARMY FRONT (Alpine Front)

At the close of the period the enemy front lines opposite the 6th US Army Group on the Alpine Front were as follows: CHAMONIX (C 4728), MT ROSELETTE (Z 4091), BOURG ST MAURICE (Z 4680), VILLAROGIER (H 4692), BESSANS (H 5260), MT TABOR (K 3522), BRIANCON (P 3898), CHATEAU QUEYRAS (P 5382), GUILLESTRE (P 4170), BARCELONETTE (P 4341), ISOLA (N 4635), ST MARTIN (N 6020), GRIMALDI (S 8088).

a. Enemy Dispositions

Information received indicates that the enemy has carefully executed a withdrawal of elements of 5 Mountain Division. It appears that the division staff and cadre remain in the area while the combat infantry strength of the division has been substantially withdrawn. Thus, the enemy has been able to drain personnel from the division for use elsewhere while maintaining German control over Italian units on the front. The 34 Infantry Division continues to hold the coastal sector with increased Italian support. The 8 Battery, 2 Artillery Regiment of the LITTORIO Division, in addition to the 2nd Separate Bersaglieri Battalion, have been identified as being under command of 34 Infantry Division.

b. General

Increased enemy activity in the high mountain areas has been permitted by improved weather conditions. Small raids by the enemy are to be expected for the purpose of creating a diversion and to increase his own prestige. No indications of general enemy withdrawal have been manifested.

4. OPERATIONS

RHINE FRONT

The enemys anxiety was evidenced by the harassing patrols which he continued to send across to the west bank of the Rhine. The numerous patrols reported in the CHALAMPE (V 8513) - KEMBS (A 8398) region was indicative of his particular interest in friendly intentions in that area. Artillery fire was generally light with the STRASBOURG and CHALAMPE-KEMBS areas receiving the major part. However, on 9 March between 0445A and 0620A approximately 2000 rounds of artillery and mortar fire fell in the area between the Rhine and the MATTERIALD (R 1317). Enemy air activity was on a reduced scale during the period, however, four aircraft, including jet planes were reported in SELESTAT-STRASBOURG area on 4 March and seven jet planes were reported south of MULHOUSE on 5 March.

SAAR - PALATINATE FRONT

The German LXXXIX Corps in the Rhine Valley and the XC Corps in the HARDT Mountains maintained a defensive attitude, but friendly patrols found the enemy on the alert. Movements in the 16 Volksgrenadier Division sector on 3 March indicated continued regrouping while activity in the BITSCHHOFFEN (Q 9128) - GUMBRECHTSHOFFEN (Q 9234) area on 5 and 7 March pointed to local reliefs. Artillery and mortar fire, although generally light and scattered, increased somewhat in the HAGUENAU area on 4 March and in the HARDT on 5 March.

In the SAAR Valley, 17 SS Panzer Grenadier Division and 19 Infantry Division remained alert to attempted friendly penetrations. 559 Volksgrenadier and 347 Infantry Divisions offered stubborn opposition to renewed friendly attacks. After prolonged house to house fighting, FORBACH was finally cleared on 5 March. On the same day an estimated 1,200 French, Russian, and Polish prisoners were liberated from a stockade at STIRING WENDEL (Q 4166). Heavy fighting continued in STIRING WENDEL until 7 March when the factory section was cleared of enemy. To the west, the BOIS DE LA RESERVE (Q 3666) was cleared and 347 Infantry Division was forced slowly back to the East-West railroad in the FORET DE FORBACH. Here the enemy dug in and was resisting stubbornly at the end of the period.

ALPINE FRONT

Improved weather permitted increased enemy activity. Outposts were established on COL DE LA GALISE (H 67) and COL D'ARNAS (H 45). PETIT ST BERNARD (C 04) and MOUNT CENIS (H 45) regions were the scene of light infantry activity and occasional artillery and mortar fire. According to reports, an armoured train equipped with twelve 155 mm

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guns was located in the SAAR (T 0089) tunnel, for the purpose of laying down heavy artillery fire on MENTON (S 78). However, these preparations were interrupted on 5 March when the tunnel was bombed by friendly aircraft causing an explosion heard twenty miles away.

#### ATLANTIC FRONT

In the LA ROCHELLE pocket on 3 March one company of enemy attempted an infiltration between friendly outposts at VENDOME (T 4748) and COSSE (T 4549). Some movement of infantry and artillery toward THAIRE (T 4225) and AIGREFEUILLE (T 4729) on 4 March lent credence to prevalent rumors of enemy action. However, no action resulted. Following the 2 March attack south of MONTALIVET (T 2747) in the GRAVE pocket, the enemy withdrew and friendly forces reoccupied old positions. Occasional exchanges of artillery fire and minor patrols characterize the activity of the period.

#### 5. COMMUNICATIONS

##### A Tactical Reconnaissance

Visual reconnaissance was greatly hampered throughout the current period by unusually bad flying weather. Only on 3 and 9 March was cover available, and even then it was by no means complete. Movements seen in the Saar on 3 March appeared to be a continuation of the activity noted in the PIRMASENS area during the latter half of the previous week and were probably connected with the move of 6 SS Mountain Division from the BITCHE area to ZERF (L 2413) where its units were identified on 6 March. On 3 March much activity was also observed along the FREIBURG-OFFENBURG line and marshalling yards at MAHLBERG (W 0666), LAHR (W 1072) and OFFENBURG appeared active.

Observations made on 9 March showed several hundred loaded motor transport moving north and east in the AUSSSEN (Q 3696) area northwest of NEUNKIRCHEN. Some light motor transport activity moving south was seen between BAD DURKHEIM and LANDAU and several loaded flats were sighted in the vicinity of LANDAU. East of the Rhine, five stationary trains totaling 150 flats loaded with motor transport and guns were seen along the FREIBURG - KARLSRUHE - PFORZHEIM line. In the KARLSRUHE marshalling yards, four trains were seen facing north and three east. Much rail activity was reported in the STUTTGART area.

On both 3 and 9 March pontoon bridging activities were observed along the Rhine between DRUSENHEIM (R 1618) and KARLSRUHE suggesting that preparations are underway to make more crossing sites available in this sector. More complete and recent information also reveals that numerous additional ferries are now in operation all along the Rhine. Exact location of these crossing is shown in Inclosure # 1.

##### B Status of Communications

Poor operational weather afforded the Germans an excellent opportunity to repair damage to rail lines and installations during the past week. Intermittent coverage revealed that facilities had been sufficiently repaired to permit the movement of through traffic on some of the more important lines recently cut. Repairs to the WORMS and BAD MUNSTER rail bridges likewise succeeded in opening additional lines to through traffic.

*Eugene L. Harrison*  
EUGENE L. HARRISON  
Brigadier General, G. S. C.  
A. C. of S., G-2

#### INCLOSURES

- #1 Inc - The Rhine Bridges
- #2 Inc - Enemy Disposition

#### DISTRIBUTION

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
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# THE RHINE BRIDGES

## -KEY-

- == PERMANENT ROAD BRIDGE
- FLOATING ROAD BRIDGE
- +++ RAIL BRIDGE
- FERRY BRIDGE
- == COMBINATION HIGHWAY-RAIL BRIDGE
- FERRY IN OPERATION

BRIDGE UNDER CONSTRUCTION.



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
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G-2 6TH ARMY GROUP  
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HEADQUARTERS 6th US ARMY GROUP  
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APO 23, U. S. Army

B(central)

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By Authority of  
CG, 6th Army Group  
Initials:  
Date: 3 March 1945

WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NUMBER 24

FOR THE WEEK ENDING 3 MARCH 1945

S31/4

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Wg Off

1. SUMMARY OF THE ENEMY SITUATION

a. Estimate of the Enemy Situation

On the Sixth Army Group front the enemy maintained a shallow line only by extensive manipulation of his dwindling forces. For some time the comparatively low priority of this sector of the Western Front has prevented the allocation of reinforcements except in the form of low grade replacements. Now even that low priority has disappeared, with the result that line units are being withdrawn for more urgent use on other fronts.

Army Group G is being compelled to rely on its natural river lines and man made positional defenses in order to compensate for the loss of troops. In spite of the obvious difficulties in which Army Group G found itself, the German High Command was forced to sacrifice further territory in the Saar-Moselle triangle in preference to sending aid. In fact, with two of Nineteenth Army's hastily rebuilt units being rushed to the COLOGNE plain, the First Army was kept from falling back along its entire front only by the arrival of another definitely scratch unit from the Black Forest. In any case, it is clear that Army Group G has no longer a true reserve for tactical employment; what little reserve strength it has is constituted only by replacements and local Volkssturm.

First German Army's position continued to deteriorate because of the lack of reserves. Two nominal divisions (49 VG and 16 VG) reappeared on the front, but neither was actually more than a division staff which served to give some tactical organization to the scattered battle groups and Volkssturm units being employed. In fact, 16 Volksgrenadier Division represents merely a different name for units formerly under command of 906 zbV Division which the former picked up as it passed westward. With 2 Mountain Division again rushed off in a stop gap capacity, the plight of First Army was made even more evident when it had to rely on remnants of the defunct 245 and 16 Volksgrenadier Divisions to replace 6 SS Mountain Division in the western HART Mountains, trusting to the naturally strong defensive value of the terrain to maintain the line. The eventual fate of 6 SS Mountain is difficult to determine, but it definitely has been withdrawn from contact. First Army can hardly hold its line against the Allied aggressive defense with the weak aggregation it now has under command. This withdrawal of one of its stronger formations leaves it still further dependent on terrain and local Volkssturm to hold what the High Command has obviously appreciated to be a defensive sector.

Nineteenth German Army still serves as a manpower siphon for the entire Western Front. Of its original eight nominal divisions, it has so far given up four (2 Mtn, 338 VG, 189 VG and 16 VG). Another of the remaining four (159 VG, 198 VG, 708 VG, 716 VG) has already at least been assembled for movement, leaving LXIV Corps and the static divisions (405 and 805) to maintain the watch on the Rhine.

OBERRHEIN Defense Command and Twenty-fourth Army maintained their existence.

b. Capabilities

Army Group G can still attempt to defend itself. In the execution of this endeavor it may elect to be destroyed along its present position or to maintain the integrity of its organization by falling back to the Rhine. The selection of the lesser evil is the only capability which remains.

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## 2. SIXTH US ARMY GROUP (Saar-Rhine Front)

a. At the close of the period the front lines of enemy forces opposite Sixth US Army Group were as follows: VOLKINGEN (Q 3573), FORBACH (Q 3965), ST ARNUAL (Q 4667), RIMLING (Q 6555), HOTTVILLE (Q 7253), ALTHORN (Q 7640), PFAFFENHOFFEN (Q 9027), DRUSENHEIM (R 1517), thence south along the Rhine to the Swiss border.

b. ARMY GROUP G (CG: SS Gen. HAUSSER)

(1) First German Army (CG: Lt. Gen. OBSTFELDER)

The threat created by the Allied bridgehead South of TRIER and the probable demands for divisions by higher headquarters upon First Army has compelled the army to continue the redistribution of its available forces. 6 SS Mountain Division was extended northward to cover the sector vacated by 2 Mountain Division early in the period and was itself later withdrawn from contact. 2 Mountain Division was sent to the SAARBURG (L 1413) area to reinforce the badly battered 256 Volksgrenadier and 416 Infantry Divisions. This was considered insufficient by the enemy as he also brought in 49 Infantry Division which had been resting and refitting for over nine weeks. In addition a battle group of 11 Panzer Division was left behind in order to eradicate the initial bridgehead over the Saar River. The sector vacated by 6 SS Mountain Division was taken over by elements formerly part of 245 Infantry Division operating as an independent battle group on the right flank; by the rehabilitated 16 Infantry Division of Nineteenth Army in the central sector; and by a westward extension of the 36 Volksgrenadier Division. sector.

6 SS Mountain Division "Nord" (CG: SS Maj. Gen. BRENNER). During the early part of the period this division expanded its sector to the right to effect the relief of 2 Mountain Divisions in the BITCHE area. Then on the night of 27/28 February it too was relieved by some miscellaneous units, 16 Infantry Division and by a shift of 36 Infantry Division sector responsibility to the west. The division made only a fair showing during its early tour of duty in this area. However, after gaining some experience and receiving a large number of reinforcements the unit fought well. Last identifications were as follows: III/12 SS Mountain Regiment at Q 8237 on 24 February; II/12 SS Mountain Regiment at Q 7449 on 28 February, and 11 SS Mountain Regiment at Q 7639 on 24 February and at Q 7837 on 28 February. The division has not yet left the First Army area. Combat infantry strength is estimated at 3,200.

245 Infantry Division (CG: Col. WAGNER). The continued presence of this unit in our sector is doubted. The elements of the division identified in the BITCHE area Q 7750 have been detached from the division for sometime. Recent prisoner of war statements indicate that no attempts were made to reinforce or reorganize the division since its abortive commitment in December. The remnants of the division, totalling 1,000 combat infantry effectives at the time, were then organized into a few battalions and later subordinated to other units in line. The two elements formerly part of the division which have been identified to date are the I/935 Volksgrenadier Regiment (previously subordinated to 36 Volksgrenadier Division) on the right and a 300 man battle group "LOETZE", composed of elements of 935 Volksgrenadier Regiment (previously subordinated to 47 Volksgrenadier Division) on the left. The sector occupied by these units is between Q 7354 and Q 7444.

(a) LXXXII Corps (CG: Maj. Gen. HAHM)

256 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Brig. Gen. FRANZ) is responsible for the sector from the Moselle River to L 2421. All regiments of the division were identified during the period in the area L 1512 and L 1714. On 27 February Volkssturm units were also found operating within the divisional area, probably as reinforcements. The organic divisional elements have been decimated as a result of recent operations west and east of the Saar River. Losses in prisoners of war from 11 February to 22 February amounted to 1,400. Present combat infantry strength is 500.

49 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: ) was identified at L 2412, on 27 February through prisoners of war yielded by 150 Volksgrenadier Regiment. This is the only unit of the division identified to date. The extent of the divisional reorganization is unknown. However, it is believed that only elements have arrived in the area south of TRIER. Combat infantry effectives are unknown.

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2 Mountain Division (CG: Brig. Gen. UTZ) relieved 559 Volksgrenadier Division in the area of BITCHE 18/20 February and in turn was relieved by 6 SS Mountain Division about 25 February. The parent units followed 82 Mountain Engineer Battalion and 67 Mountain Reconnaissance Battalion into the SCHWARZWALD DER HOCHWALD region where its services were in very heavy demand in order to reinforce 416 Infantry Division. The division presently holds a sector from ZERF (L 2412) to L 2008. On the basis of preliminary interrogation, it appears that the division has consolidated its remnants into a reduced table of organization. The two mountain regiments have two battalions each and each battalion has only three companies. The combat infantry effectives total 1,200.

416 Infantry Division (CG: Maj. Gen. PFLIEGER) must be considered as virtually destroyed as the result of its recent engagements. Several battalions were over run and others were practically annihilated as they tried to retreat across the Saar. Among the prisoners were 2 regimental and several battalion commanders. Remnants committed in area L 1906 do not exceed 300 combat infantry effectives.

Major General PFLIEGER is indicated as having taken over command of the battle group of 11 Panzer Division which stayed behind after the bulk of the panzer division left for COLOGNE area beginning its move on or about 13 February. The unit remaining had approximately 18 tanks. The fate suffered by this battle group is unknown.

(b) LXXXV Corps (CG: Lt. Gen. KNISS)

Corps headquarters was reported at HABACH (Q 438878).

719 Infantry Division (CG: Brig. Gen. GAEDE) appears to have extended its already drawn out front to assist the remnants of 416 Infantry Division. The divisional front is now believed to extend from L 1902 to SAARLAUTERN (Q 2880). The division remained unidentified during the period, probably due to the fact that it is occupying SIEGFRIED Defenses east of the Saar. There is some indication that II Battalion 723 Grenadier Regiment, last identified south of SAARBRUECKEN on 26 February may have returned to its present unit. Division combat infantry strength is still 3,500.

347 Infantry Division (CG: Maj. Gen. TRIERENBERG) contracted to the west to make way for the commitment of 559 Volksgrenadier Division. 347 Division now holds from SAARLAUTERN (Q 2880) to FORBACH (Q 4066). Last identification s were: 860 Grenadier Regiment at Q 3966, 26 February; 861 Grenadier Regiment at Q 3965, 1 March and 880 Grenadier Regiment at Q 3965, 28 February. A large part of the division's forces are fighting in the northern portion of FORBACH which has been stubbornly defended. In the remainder of the sector contact was light. 67 Reconnaissance Battalion is no longer in the area having been identified in the SAARBURG sector with its parent unit, 2 Mountain Division. The anti-tank units listed under 347 Infantry Division last week have probably come under command of 559 Volksgrenadier Division.

The divisional Anti-Tank Battalion is organized along the line of the new 1945 Table of Organization. Due to losses, only 8 assault guns (75 mm) still remain, and on the basis of prisoners statements, combat infantry strength is lowered to 1,600 plus 300 for the attached 12 Landeschützen Battalion.

(c) XIII SS Corps (CG: Maj. Gen. MAX SIMON)

559 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Brig. Gen. von der MUEHLEN). It is now clear that the division was relieved by 2 Mountain Division around 18 February in the BITCHE area. Waiting only long enough to assemble, the division marched west to take over a sector directly south of SAARBRUECKEN between 347 and 19 Infantry Divisions. The sector of the division extends from Q 4066 on the west to Q 4966 on the east. Identification were: 1126 Volksgrenadier Regiment on 26 February, at Q 4267; 1127 Volksgrenadier Regiment on 25 February, at Q 4769 and Q 4468. A prisoner of war of 1126 Regiment believes that both battalions of 1126 Regiment have now been reformed. However, the second battalion has not yet been contacted. Other prisoners state that several divergencies from the new table of organization exist. Instead of regimental anti-tank companies, anti-tank weapons are said to be within the battalion heavy companies. Furthermore, the division is said

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to have two reconnaissance troops made mobile with bicycles and armed with machine guns. The assault gun company, part of the anti-tank battalion, suffered losses and now has only six 75 mm assault guns remaining. Probably attached to the division are 486 Anti-Tank Battalion, 5/XVII Anti-Tank Company, and 103 Tank Destroyer Brigade. Prisoners captured from this division during the past period made the first references to Volkssturm personnel being made available to divisions in combat as reinforcements. Combat infantry effectives are estimated at 2,400 including 400 attached effectives.

19 Infantry Division (CG: Brig. Gen. BRITZELMAYR) shortened its sector on both flanks and now holds the line between the Saar River (Q 4966) and Q 5560. The fighting in this area has slackened considerably, resulting in fewer contacts. Identifications made were: 74 Grenadier Regiment on 20 February at Q 5462; 119 Engineer Battalion on 27 February at Q 5264; and 19 Fusilier Company on 26 February at Q 5363. Though a prisoner stated that 59 Grenadier Regiment, which had been virtually destroyed, was to be reactivated, the division is in very poor shape and combat infantry effectives are carried at 1,000.

17 SS Panzer Grenadier Division (CG: SS Col. KLINGENBERG) was recovering its balance after the heavy blows of the previous week. The division extended its right flank 2-3 miles to the west and now holds the sector from Q 5560 to Q 7354. Apart from small skirmishes contact was loose and the only identifications were: 37 SS Panzer Grenadier Regiment at Q 6957, 28 February; 38 SS Panzer Grenadier Regiment at Q 6456, 28 February and 17 SS Reconnaissance Battalion at Q 5658 on 2 March. The division staff is planning a defense in great depth as indicated by the preparations being carried out. The divisional G P has not only been withdrawn to ZWEIBRUCKEN, eleven miles behind the lines, but also a secondary defense line has been constructed three miles to the rear of present positions.

2 Company of 17 SS Assault Gun Battalion was identified west of the division sector, at Q 4567. It is thought that this company was detached and is serving as a XIII SS Corps mobile reserve. Prisoners draw attention to the division's successful ruse of using decoy tanks to draw our fire and to give the impression of great armored strength.

Approximately 200 replacements from the divisional replacement battalion were split between the regiments. 38 Panzer Grenadier Regiment is in the process of reforming its third battalion. Combat infantry strength, including these replacements, is estimated at 2,000 on the basis of detailed interrogation. The division has lost 630 prisoners since 15 February.

(d) XC Corps (CG: Lt. Gen. PETERSEN)

16 Volksgrenadier Division (CO: Col. MOECKEL), last reported with the other survivors of ALSACE in the Black Forest, became heir to 6 SS Mountain Division's HARDT sector from Q 7444 to Q 8135. Identifications made to date are: 221 Grenadier Regiment at Q 7938 on 1 March; 225 Grenadier Regiment at Q 7444 on 2 March; and 16 Fusilier Battalion at Q 7738 on 2 March. Details regarding the division's present status are still lacking. It has been ascertained that I Battalion 221 Regiment is the former Battalion MORG (VI Bn OBERRHAIN) of 905 Mobilization Division. Due to the division's depleted state when it left ALSACE, other battalions may also have been grafted. It is interesting to note that, contrary to Volksgrenadier Divisional organization, paybook entries show that the former 1316 Reconnaissance Company was renumbered to 16 Fusilier Battalion. Combat infantry strength is given tentatively as 1,500.

36 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Brig. Gen. WELLEM) continued to stay in very light contact from Q 8235 to Q 9227. The division is utilizing this quiet interlude for its long overdue rehabilitation. The units from BAUMHOLDER (PFALZ), promised for months, have finally arrived, incorporated in a 36 Division AUFRISCHUNGS (Replacement) Regiment. 9 - 11 Companies of this regiment became II Battalion 165 Grenadier Regiment. What became of the rest of the Replacement Regiment is not known for certain. It is highly probable that it was used to reform I Battalion 87 Grenadier Regiment identified on 2 March, and the regimental companies, thus putting the division back on the standard 3 regiment - 2 battalion basis. Identifications were: 165 Grenadier Regiment at Q 8434 on 28 February; 87 Grenadier Regiment on 2 March; and 36 Engineer Battalion at Q 9022 on 1 March. The combat infantry strength of the division is now estimated at 2,000.

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(CG: Lt. Gen. HOEHNE)

47 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Maj. Gen. BORK) continued to hold its old sector from Q 9227 to just west of HAGUENAU (R 0224) with elements of all 3 regiments in line. Identifications were: 103 Volksgrenadier Regiment, 1 March at R 0124; 104 Volksgrenadier Regiment, 2 March at Q 9227; and 115 Volksgrenadier Regiment, 2 March at Q 9726. Prisoners of war state that 47 Volksgrenadier Division is to move to the BITCHE area. Though not likely, this is a possibility. Prisoners also report the arrival of some replacements from the divisional Replacement Battalion at SCHWETZINGEN on 24 February. On this basis, strength is increased to 1,700.

257 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Brig. Gen. SEIDEL) remained responsible for a sector including HAGUENAU (R 0224) and OBERHOFFEN (R 0920). Activity was still at a minimum and the only identification made was that of 457 Volksgrenadier Regiment on 26 February at R 0523. I Battalion 2 SS Police Regiment and Battle Groups HARTIG and HEIDMANN are still attached. The organic combat infantry strength of the division is 1,600 and the strength of its attachments total 400.

905 Mobilization Division (CG: ) was not identified during the period. However, it is believed that the division is still holding the sector from R 1120 to the Rhine. A Battalion MORG, formerly under 2 SS Police Regiment, was identified in the sector of 16 Volksgrenadier Division. It appears that 905 Division has given up some of the units listed under its command as of 1 February. The line is held by not more than 800 men with a further 500 troops being held in reserve or manning positions east of the Rhine. Total combat infantry effectives total 1,300.

(2) Nineteenth German Army (CG: Lt. Gen. RASP)

To date the Nineteenth Army has lost 2 Mountain, 16 and 189 Volksgrenadier, and 338 Infantry Divisions, the latter two divisions having been identified in the KREFELD area. Consequently only 159 and 708 Volksgrenadier, 198 and 716 Infantry Divisions and 106 Panzer Brigade remain under control of the Army and out of contact. Rail movements in the area indicate that 159 Volksgrenadier Division may be departing and tend to confirm the belief that 106 Panzer Brigade has gone.

It is significant that none of the redeployed divisions were units under the control of LXIV Corps (708 Volksgrenadier, 198 and 716 Infantry Divisions). It would seem, therefore, that this Corps is destined to remain in the Black Forest area. Obviously, sufficient time has elapsed for all of the Nineteenth Army units which escaped from the COLMAR pocket to have been reorganized and absorbed sufficient reinforcements to make them capable of limited employment. Although the recommitment of former Nineteenth Army divisions in other sectors was undoubtedly premature and caused by the exigencies of the situation, in no case should they be regarded as being totally impotent.

159 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Brig. Gen. BUERCKY) was last reported in the area FREIBURG-TUTTLINGEN area. The observed northward rail movement on the line HASLACH-DONAUESCHINGEN on 1-2 March may well equate with the departure of this unit from the Black Forest. It is the only defeated division of LXIII Corps formerly in the VOSGES pocket which has not been recommitted on another sector of the front.

(a) LXIV Corps (CG: Lt. Gen. THUMM) is still believed to be refitting in the OFFENBURG area. Strength estimates for the remaining divisions are not ventured at this time as the extent of replacements received and service personnel retrained for infantry duty is not known. A figure of 1,200 combat infantry effectives is accepted for each division prior to commitment.

198 Infantry Division (CO: Col. BARTEL) is located east of OFFENBURG (W 1585).

708 Volksgrenadier (CO: Col. BLECKWENN) is located north of HASLACH (W 2664).

716 Infantry Division (CO: Col. HAFNER) is probably still in the KEHL (W 0596) region.

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(b) XVIII SS Corps (CG: SS Lt. Gen. REINEFARTH)

The headquarters of this corps are believed to be at BADENWEILLER (V 9511). Its operational status is unchanged.

c. DEFENCE COMMAND OBERRHEIN (CG: )

No change in status.

405 Reserve Division (CG: Maj. Gen. SEEGER) is still responsible for SIEGFRIED Line defenses along the Rhine, north and south of KEHL (W 0596).

30 SS Grenadier Division (CO: Col. SIEGLING). No further clarification of its actual existence is available.

805 Mobilization Division (CG: ) remains responsible for SIEGFRIED Line defenses along the east bank of the Rhine north of BRISACH.

1005 Brigade Staff (CO: ) was reported in the NEUNBURG (V 8713) area and in immediate command of the OBERRHEIN Regiment. In view of its number, it logically falls into the 405, 805, 905 series. It is a Wehrkreis V unit which may eventually be upgraded to a divisional status. Its present sector extends along the Rhine, north of LOERRACH (A 9590).

d. TWENTY-FOURTH ARMY (CG: SS Lt. Gen. HANS SCHMIDT)

Status of this army remains unchanged.

e. 600 Infantry Division (Russian) is still located at MUNSINGEN with no further details as to its organization having been received.

f. ENEMY STRENGTH OPPOSITE SIXTH US ARMY GROUP (Saar-Palatinate-Rhine Front)

Divisional Units in Contact and Reserve:  
(Combat Infantry Effectives)

Saar-Palatinate Front	18,500
Rhine Front	4,000

Reserves: (Estimated)

Saar-Palatinate Front	5,000
Black Forest	5,000

T O T A L	32,500
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Artillery Guns:

Saar-Palatinate	600
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Tanks and SP Guns:

Saar-Palatinate Front	140-160
Saar-Palatinate Front (Reserves)	50- 70
Rhine River Front	15- 20

T O T A L	205-250
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### 3. SIXTH US ARMY GROUP FRONT (Alpine Front)

At the close of the period the enemy front lines opposite the Sixth US Army Group on the Alpine Front were as follows: CHAMONIX (C 4728), MT ROSELETTE (Z 4091), BOURG ST MAURICE (Z 4680), VILLAROGGER (H 4692), BESSANS (H 5260), MT TABOR (K 3522), BRIANCON (P 3898), CHATEAU QUEYRAS (P 5382), GUILLESTRE (P 4170), BARCELONNETTE (P 4341), ISOLA (N 4635), ST MARTIN (N 6020), GRIMALDI (S 8088),

#### a. Enemy Dispositions

Although there have been persistent reports that the MONTE ROSA Division is gradually relieving 5 Mountain Division, there has been no apparent major change in enemy dispositions in that sector. The identification of 100 Mountain Regiment of 5 Mountain Division in the ALLESANDRIA area by partisans on 21 February does not coincide with the PW identification of that regiment on 17 February in the MOUNT BLANC area. The relief of German combat troops by the LITTORIO Division in the CUNEO area is possible explanation for the reported departure of 1000 German service troops from this area. That 34 Infantry Division continues to be in the area is evident from prisoner of war identification as late as 1 March.

#### b. General

The prevailing weather conditions during March will prevent the assumption of an offensive attitude by the enemy. However, it is to be expected that the enemy will continue to defend his present positions by sending out frequent parties for harassing and intelligence purposes.

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#### 4. OPERATIONS

##### RHINE FRONT

Throughout the period, patrols continued to cross to the west bank of the Rhine in an attempt to ascertain friendly dispositions and intentions. His quest for information was materially aided by the improved weather conditions which permitted daily air reconnaissance of the Alsace region.

On 24 February a combat patrol from the 3rd Russian (Ukrainian) Depot Regiment, estimated at two platoons in strength, attacked friendly outpost east of MARCKOLSHEIM (V 8653). The patrol suffered heavy casualties from artillery fire and was forced to withdraw across the river leaving 23 prisoners in friendly hands. Moderate success was gained by the enemy raids when three friendly prisoners were taken on 25 February southeast of NEUF BRISACH (V 8736) and four additional prisoners were taken in the NIEFFER (V 8301) area on 2 March. The enemy artillery fire was generally light along the entire Rhine front.

##### SAAR-PALATINATE FRONT

From the Rhine to the HARDT Mountains, the enemy's defensive attitude continued as field positions were improved and mines were laid between the HAGUENAU Forest and NEIDERBRONN (Q 9238) area by 47 and 36 Volksgrenadier Divisions. Reactions to friendly patrols proved the enemy alert while movements in rear areas indicated that a westward extension of divisional sectors was being carried out in the HARDT region. Artillery fire was comparatively light but during night 24-25 February, a 380 mm gun near HOFFEN (R 1536) and a 170 mm gun near BAERENTHAL (Q 8442) placed five and seven rounds, respectively, on SAVERNE (Q 7215).

The extensive movements behind the lines in the HARDT Mountains sector resulted in the relief of 2 Mountain Division and later 6 SS Mountain Division. 6 SS Mountain Division temporarily assumed responsibility for 2 Mountain Division's sector until it in turn was also relieved. The change over was carried out by the employment of miscellaneous battle group formations in the BITCHE area (Q 7750), 16 Infantry Division, newly arrived from the Nineteenth Army, in the central sector, and by 36 Infantry Division which extended its right flank to the west. On the front our patrols found the enemy extended but alert, while friendly observation posts were harassed somewhat by artillery fire.

In the Saar Valley, 19 Infantry Division, offering moderate opposition with small arms and artillery fire, was forced from BUBINGEN (Q 4964) and BLIESRANSBACH (Q 5263) on 24 February. In an attempt to regain some of the lost ground, this division later in the afternoon mounted three unsuccessful counterattacks north of BLIESRANSBACH with infantry troops supported by armour. An additional attack was mounted on 27 February which also failed. After spending himself on these ventures, he was content to dig in and await the next friendly move.

559 Volksgrenadier Division and 347 Infantry Division, aided by Volkssturm, made repeated attempts to retake the high ground overlooking SAARBRUCKEN. Minor attacks and attempted infiltrations into woods east of STIRING-WENDEL (Q 4166) were only temporarily successful. At the close of the period, the enemy still held STIRING-WENDEL and the northwest portion of FORBACH as artillery and mortar fire exchanges became the predominant activity.

##### ALPINE FRONT

On 24 February the enemy repulsed a friendly patrol at K 4902 with strong small arms fire and on the same day, one of our outposts at K 4313 was subjected to some machine gun fire. The possible renewal of enemy attacks on AIGUILLE DEMIDI (C 5024) was indicated by the arrival of two supply convoys at REFUGES TURINO MARGARITO (C 5318). Activity in the coastal area was confined to harassing artillery fire.

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## WESTERN FRENCH FORCES

Enemy activity in the LA ROCHELLE pocket was concentrated in the northern zone. He carried out numerous reconnaissance missions in attempts to ascertain friendly troop dispositions. During this time, the Germans also completed their own regrouping and brought up supplies. Preparations were completed on 1 March and the attack was launched in the direction of ANAIS (T 5137) and ST JEAN (T 5346) with one battalion of infantry. By 0900A I Battalion 223 Grenadier Regiment had penetrated into ST JEAN and by 1130A fighting was in progress in ST SAUVEUR (T 5241). At the end of the day, as a result of friendly counterattacks, the enemy was forced to withdraw to a line: SUIRE (T 4845), 500 meters west of SOURDON (T 5044), BOIS DE BEAUREGARD (T 5042), 500 meters west of ST SAUVEUR (T 5241), ANAIS (T 5137).

In the ROYAN sector, the enemy's only activities were occasional exchanges of artillery fire and minor patrol activity. On 2 March, the POINTE DE GRAVE pocket became the scene of an enemy attack when 200-300 enemy pushed four kilometers south of MONTALIVET (Y 2747) before being contained by friendly forces.

### 5. COMMUNICATIONS

#### A Tactical Reconnaissance

Renewed road and rail activity at key points throughout the SAAR-PALATINATE-BADEN areas were brought about by a further shuffling and movements of enemy units during the period. Activity in the region of the Black Forest on 25 February and 2 March indicated that additional military units of the Nineteenth Army were entraining and moving to the north toward the more active battle areas. Extensive traffic seen in the KARLSRUHE-HEILBRONN-WORMS area on 25 February appeared to be connected with some reinforcements or perhaps a unit arriving into the SAAR. The heavy activity observed on 1 and 2 March in the NEUNKIRCHEN area and along the PIRMASENS-LANDAU line indicates that a unit withdrawal was in progress.

The OFFENBURG-FREIBURG-DONAUESCHINGEN line as well as the ROTTWEIL-HORB-STUTTGART line showed considerable activity throughout the period with definite indications that military moves were underway in the OFFENBURG-DONAUESCHINGEN area. On 2 March, four military trains were seen on the OFFENBURG-DONAUESCHINGEN line with the trend of movement being to the north. Rail activity in the DONAUESCHINGEN area and in the area east of FREIBURG on both 1 and 2 March serves to confirm the belief that the resources of the Nineteenth Army are being further tapped for duty on more active sectors.

Heavy rail traffic was observed in the KARLSRUHE-HEILBRONN-WORMS area on 25, 27 February and again on 2 March. The marshalling yards in this sector likewise simultaneously revealed heavy loadings and considerable activity. Although much of this activity appeared to be normal two way traffic of civilian needs, commercial traffic, supplies and materiel, the direction of the military trains on 2 March indicated a move to the north towards MAINZ, traveling out of our zone.

In connection with the activity seen east of the Rhine on 25 and 27 February, it appears that some of this traffic carried reinforcements for the SAAR-PALATINATE where it was evident that arrivals had taken place early in the current period. In the NEUNKIRCHEN-SAARBRUCKEN area on 1 March several rakes of empty flat cars, as well as one loaded infantry type train, were seen, but cover of the following day revealed that these were no longer present in same area. The fact that moderately heavy rail activity including some military trains, was noted in the ZWEIBRUCKEN-PIRMASENS area on 2 March leads to the possible conclusion that the railroad rolling stock which had been seen in the NEUNKIRCHEN area on the previous day was being used to make up the trains needed to move military traffic away from our immediate front.

#### B Status of Communications

Despite repeated concentrated attack upon their railway system, the Germans are still able to route their traffic through or around important rail centers as was indicated by the amount of movement observed throughout the period. The persistent cutting of enemy rail lines during the week did succeed in canalizing and even interdicting traffic on certain lines, but through traffic along these main routes was rapidly re-established. However, the unserviceable rail bridge at RASTATT

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continues to prevent through traffic along the KARLSRUHE-OFFENBURG line and the partially destroyed rail bridge over the Rhine at RUEDESHEIN (M 1553) undoubtedly causes a major disruption of rail routing into BAD KREUZNACH. This unserviceable bridge at RUEDESHEIN also accounts in all probability for the relatively light traffic seen throughout the northern portion of the SAAR-PALATINATE.

*Eugene L. Harrison*  
EUGENE L. HARRISON  
Brigadier General, G. S. C.  
A. C. of S., G-2

INCLOSURES


Inc #1 - The Rhine Bridges  
Inc #2 - Enemy Disposition

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# THE RHINE BRIDGES



## -KEY-

- == PERMANENT ROAD BRIDGE
- FLOATING ROAD BRIDGE
- +++ RAIL BRIDGE
- FERRY BRIDGE
- || COMBINATION HIGHWAY-RAIL BRIDGE
- FERRY IN OPERATION

31200 A MARCH  
ENCL. #1 TO  
WEEKLY INTELL.  
SUM. #24

G-2 6TH ARMY GROUP  
SCALE: 1/500,000

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ARMY GROUP  
FIRST ARMY

DEFENSE COMMAND OBERREIN  
NINETEENTH ARMY

TWENTY-FOURTH ARMY

DECLASSIFIED

ENEMY DISPOSITION  
AS OF 3 1200 A MARCH

6TH ARMY GROUP  
ENCL. #2 TO  
WEEKLY INTELL. SUM. #24

SCALE 1/1,000,000

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
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HEADQUARTERS 6th US ARMY GROUP  
Office of the A. C. of S., G-2  
APO 23, U. S. Army

By Authority of  
CG, 6th Army Group  
Initials: *ELH*  
Date: 24 Feb 1945

WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NUMBER 23

FOR THE WEEK ENDING 24 FEBRUARY 1945



1. SUMMARY OF THE ENEMY SITUATION

a. Estimate of the Enemy Situation

The enemy's defensive attitude between the Moselle and Rhine Rivers continued for still another week. The lengths to which he was forced in order to maintain his lines unbroken - the sacrifice of German soil in the Moselle - Saar triangle and of German civilians at FORBACH - strengthen the belief that he has no alternative. On the BADEN front extreme nervousness as to Allied intentions is the sole explanation for the sporadic raids across the Rhine.

Army Group G found it necessary to draw on the depleted Nineteenth Army in order to preserve the First Army in this extremity. Its mission of providing the mobile forces necessary for adequately defending the Siegfried Line is steadily becoming more impossible to fulfill. With the entire Allied front in motion, Army Group G will find it difficult even to protect its forces from the demands of the other hardpressed German armies. From SAARBURG to SAARBRUCKEN the Siegfried Line has become the front line. Now General HAUSSER must prepare to execute his mission with only his own resources and they cannot be fully counted upon.

First German Army demonstrated the effect of its lack of reserves upon present operations. The new alignment of divisions represents actually a desperate attempt to meet a situation where the initiative is entirely in the hands of the Allies. From West to East, the major formations were identified as follows:  
LXXXII Infantry Corps (256 VG and 416 Inf Divs); LXXXV Infantry Corps (719 and 347 Inf Divs); XIII SS Corps (559 VG, 19 VG, 17 SS PG and 2 Mtn Divs); XC Infantry Corps (6 SS Mtn and 36 VG Divs); and LXXXIX Infantry Corps (47 VG, 257 VG, and 905 zbV Divs). Especially notable were the displacement of 559 Volksgrenadier Division by the newly arrived 2 Mountain Division and the move of the former westward to aid in the defense of FORBACH. Reconstruction of the maneuver would indicate a redistribution of limited forces conditioned strictly by an appreciation of Allied intentions. The sudden increase in the gravity of the situation at FORBACH outweighed the enemy's fears of Allied attacks in the HAGUENAU area. 559 Volksgrenadier Division had evidently been moving east of the HARDT while 2 Mountain Division was preparing to occupy the vacated sector. The threat to FORBACH forced immediate despatch of reinforcements, principally elements of 559 Division but also including 2 Mountain Division's Reconnaissance Battalion. The use of Volkssturm battalions at SPICHEREN (Q 4366) and at FORBACH, the hasty march of a battalion of 719 Infantry Division, and the coordination of the defense by the town commandant at SAARBRUCKEN all point to the measures which the enemy must employ merely to hold his lines. The reserves of the First Army are obviously nearing the point of complete commitment.

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Nineteenth German Army has already given up one of its divisions (2 Mtn) for the SAAR front. The others have scarcely had sufficient time for rehabilitation. In any case, this defeated army can supply possibly two more divisional formations by gathering together staffs and personnel from its remnants. In the meantime, it can continue to serve as the mobile force for the Upper Rhine.

OBERRHINE Defense Command maintained its watch on the Rhine.

b. Capabilities

Army Group G has still only one capability: to attempt to defend itself. It may do this by falling back entirely into the psychological safety of the SIEGFRIED Line's masonry or by fighting delaying actions from behind its prepared positions. There is no doubt that it will never regain the initiative. There is no doubt that the execution of its mission will be more an attempt than a capability.

2. SIXTH US ARMY GROUP FRONT (Saar-Rhine Front)

a. At the close of the period the front lines of enemy forces opposing Sixth US Army group were as follows: VOLKLINGEN (Q 3573), FORBACH (Q 3965), ST ARNAL (Q 4667), RIMLING (Q 6555), BITCHE (Q 7750), ALTHORN (Q 7640), PFAFFENHOFFEN (Q 9027), DRUSSENHEIM (R 1517), South along Rhine River to border of Switzerland.

b. ARMY GROUP G (CG: SS Gen. HAUSSEER)

(1) First German Army (CG: Lt. Gen. OBSTFELDER)

The withdrawal of its right flank from the Moselle to the Saar imposed extensive reorganization of the First Army's troop dispositions. It was able to maintain the integrity of its lines in the central sector only by committing its reserves and by further withdrawal. Of its two reserve divisions, 2 Mountain is now in the lines and the existence of 245 Infantry as an organic unit is now somewhat doubtful. At best 245 Infantry Division can be considered more a divisional staff controlling Volkssturm and defense units in the rear areas rather than a formation with tactical capabilities.

245 Infantry Division (CO: Col. WAGNER). The precise nature of this division has long been a riddle. Not more than two of its battalions, (I Bn. 935 GR and I Bn. 937 GR) have been committed at any time since the middle of December. It is inconceivable that the German Army could afford to hold a field division in reserve for this length of time. The division command has repeatedly been reported in the WISSEMBOURG sector of the SIEGFRIED Line. It is believed that, when the division was relieved in December, much of its remnants were consolidated into the two battalions that have been contacted and that the divisional staff then assumed control of diverse static units known to be manning SIEGFRIED defenses. The combat infantry strength of the two original battalions, one or both of which may be detached, is estimated at 300 each; that of the static units at 2,500.

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(a) LXXXII Corps (CG: Maj. Gen. HAHM)

256 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Brig. Gen. FRANZ) retained all its subordinated units in line in an effort to stem Allied advance, but, by the end of the period, the division had withdrawn across the Saar River to new defense positions. It became clear that 256 Division was holding a sector north of 416 Infantry Division. This sector is limited by the Moselle to the north, and SERRIG (L 1510) to the south. Elements of the three grenadier regiments (456, 476, 481) and all auxiliary units were identified in the area on 20 February. Interrogation showed that the division had an average rifle company strength of 50 at the time of its commitment, about 10 February. Losses since then have been considerable and present combat infantry strength is not in excess of 1,000.

416 Infantry Division (CG: Maj. Gen. PFLIEGER) had the bulk of its units concentrated in the area L 0502 - L 0704 on 19 February. At this time elements of 712, 713, and 774 Grenadier Regiments, 416 Artillery Regiment, 416 Engineer Battalion, and 1416 Anti-Tank Battalion were identified in the area. By the end of the period, the division completed its withdrawal to the SIEGFRIED Line positions on the east bank of the Saar. Its present sector extends from L 1510 to MERZIG (Q 2095). The division suffered heavy permanent casualties during the week, thus reducing its combat infantry effectives to approximately 2,500 men.

(b) LXXXV Corps (CG: Lt. Gen. KNISS)

719 Infantry Division (CG: Brig. Gen. GAEDE) is still responsible for the line from MERZIG (Q 2095) to SAARLAUTERN (Q 2880). II Battalion, 723 Grenadier Regiment was identified at Q 4667 on 21 February. This battalion, after resting for several weeks, was sent to bolster 347 Infantry Division in its defense of SAARBRUCKEN. Prisoners claim that the battalion is under the SAARBRUCKEN Defense Command. The whereabouts of the remainder of 723 Regiment is not known. 743 Regiment was located in its old area Q 2881 on 17 February. Division combat infantry strength is now estimated at 3,500.

347 Infantry Division (CG: Maj. Gen. TRIERENBERG) is possibly continuing to hold the sector as far north as SAARLAUTERN. However, its forces are concentrated south and southwest of SAARBRUCKEN for defense of the city itself. The division offered stubborn resistance against Allied attacks. After suffering considerable losses, the division was reinforced by the commitment of local Volkssturm units, 67 Reconnaissance Battalion of 2 Mountain Division, 103 Tank Destroyer Brigade (also known as T D Bn GUSTAV or T D Bn "G" zbV), 486 Anti-Tank (Brigade) Battalion, 1313 Fortress Artillery Battalion. Furthermore, II Battalion, 723 Grenadier Regiment (719 Inf Div) was shifted east from the MERZIG area, and II Battalion, 1127 Volksgrenadier Regiment (559 VG Div) was shifted west from the BITCHE area to reinforce the defenders of SAARBRUCKEN. The last identifications were: 860 Grenadier Regiment at Q 3965 and Q 4467 on 22 February; 861 Grenadier Regiment At Q 3172 on 22 February; 880 Grenadier Regiment at Q 4066 and Q 4367 on 22 February; 347 Artillery Regiment at Q 4169 on 22 February; 347 Engineer and Anti-Tank Battalion at Q 4467 on 22 February; 347 Replacement Battalion at Q 4267 on 22 February; 103 Tank Destroyer Brigade at Q 4570 on 20 February; 486 Bazooka Battalion at Q 4969 on 22 February. The divisions authorized assault gun strength of 14 is increased by 25 assault guns of attached 103 Tank Destroyer Brigade. The divisions casualties amounted to at least 600 men, reducing organic combat infantry strength to about 1,800 men, excluding Volkssturm.

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(c) XIII SS Corps (CG: SS Maj. Gen. MAX SIMON)

Has the sector from SAARBRUCKEN to BITCHE area and controls 559 Infantry, 19 Infantry, 17 SS Panzer Grenadier and 2 Mountain Divisions. The corps has not only been forced to withdraw its forward positions under pressure, but also has needed more forces to prevent a breach of its lines. First Army was compelled to subordinate 2 Mountain Division to the corps on about 18/20 February. Due to the two distinct terrain features presently within the corps boundaries there is a strong likelihood that its responsibilities will be reduced to cover only the single terrain feature directly and indirectly connected with the defense of the Blies Valley. The result of this shortening of the sector will be that 2 Mountain Division will come under the tactical control of XC Corps.

19 Infantry Division (CG: Brig. Gen. BRITZELMAYR). Prior to the arrival of 559 Volksgrenadier Division on its right flank, 19 Infantry Division was concentrating its forces in the defense of the area just east of FORBACH although its entire sector extended to the east as far as Q 5857. The division fought with much determination throughout the period. Its present sector extends from Q 4467 to Q 5857. All infantry regiments were identified within the area Q 4467 to Q 4862 as was 1119 Anti-Tank battalion. A prisoner states that the Anti-Tank battalion has two assault gun companies of eight guns each. In present heavy defensive fighting the division suffered heavy losses and its present strength is estimated at 1,000 combat infantry effectives.

17 SS Panzer Grenadier Division (CG: SS Col. KLINGENBERG) fought well but took heavy punishment resisting our attacks of 15-16 February. The divisional sector extends from Q 5957 to Q 7453. 37 SS Grenadier Regiment was identified on 23 February at Q 6656; 38 SS Grenadier Regiment was last contacted on 22 February at Q 6556 and 6156; 38 SS Grenadier Regiment is one more of the First German Army units to be reported as not having heavy weapons companies in the battalions. Remnants of both regiments are reported to have been reorganized on a two-battalion basis. 500 casualties since 15 February are accepted, thus, lowering the division combat infantry strength to 2,000.

559 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Brig. Gen. von der MUEHLEN) during the early days of the period held a sector southwest of BITCHE (Q 7750) to Q 7545. The last identifications in this area were: 1125 Volksgrenadier Regiment at Q 6956 on 17 February; 1126 Volksgrenadier Regiment at Q 7445 on 17 February; 1127 Volksgrenadier Regiment at Q 7449 on 16 February. The commitment of I Battalion 1125 Volksgrenadier Regiment seems to have merely been an expedient to aid in keeping firm the left flank of 17 SS Panzer Grenadier Division during the US push. It was also the first identifications of this regiment which was reconstituted from elements of XII/1 Static Regiment since its dissolution in December.

The division was relieved of its sector in this area on the following days and went into line in the SAARBRUCKEN area on the right of 19 Infantry Division via WISSENBURG-PIRMASENS-Saarbrücken. II Battalion 1127 Volksgrenadier Regiment was identified at Q 4468. Present combat infantry strength is estimated at 2,000.

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2 Mountain Division (CG: Brig. Gen. DEGEN) equates with the unidentified division which arrived into First Army area during prior period. The division replaced 559 Volksgrenadier Division in the BITCHE sector. The following identifications were made: 136 Mountain Regiment at Q 7452 on 23 February; 137 was stated by a prisoner of war to be on the right of 136 Mountain Regiment; 67 Reconnaissance Battalion was contacted in the FORBACH area on 22 February. The dispatch of the reconnaissance battalion to FORBACH (Q 3866) was merely a temporary expedient. 2 Mountain Division lost 4,800 prisoners in the COIMAR pocket and its combat infantry effectives were considered to have been actually destroyed as of 8 February. However, much of the artillery and service elements reached the east bank of the Rhine. Combat infantry strength depends entirely on the number of men retrained from supply services and on the number of replacements received during the past two weeks. Its combat infantry strength is tentatively estimated at 1,200.

(d) XC Corps (CG: Lt. Gen. PETERSEN)

6 SS Mountain Division "Nord" (CG: SS Maj. Gen. BRENNER) continued to defend its drawn out HARDT Mountain sector from Q 7442 to Q 8433. Contact was relatively light as the division held elements in local reserve for purposes of refitting. The division obviously has a high priority on replacement as witnessed by the fact that prisoners claim 1,300 replacements to have been received since the beginning of February. Of these, 800 are said to be Moslems. The majority of these new comers came from AUSTRIA. Some of these replacements are still with the divisional field replacement battalion; others have already been absorbed by line units, raising the combat infantry strength of 11 Mountain Regiment to about 1,400. 11 Mountain Regiment was last identified at Q 7738 on 22 February; 12 Mountain Regiment at Q 8237 on 23 February. Division combat infantry strength, including the attached 506 SS Panzer Grenadier Battalion, is 3,200 men.

36 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Brig. Gen. WELLEM) was not identified during the period, probably due to lack of activity on its front from Q 8433 to Q 9227. Identification of I Battalion, 935 Grenadier Regiment at Q 9227 on 20 February is interpreted as a bolstering of the feeble 36 Volksgrenadier Division, rather than as a full scale commitment of 245 Infantry Division. Maximum combat infantry strength, including I Battalion, 935 Regiment and 51 German Air Force Battalion, is 1,800.

(e) LXXXIX Corps (CG: Lt. Gen. HOEHNE)

47 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Maj. Gen. BORK) remained in light contact in its sector west of HAGUENAU, continuing to hold from Q 9227 to R 0325. Identifications made were: 103 Grenadier Regiment at R 0324 and Q 9924 on 19 and 19 February; 104 Grenadier Regiment at Q 9427 on 21 February; 115 Grenadier Regiment at Q 9726 on 16 February. The status of the division is substantially unchanged, combat infantry strength is still estimated at 1,500.

257 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Brig. Gen. SEIDEL) was inactive during this week while recuperating from the heavy losses of the past period. Its sector is unchanged, from HAGUENAU (R 0325) to east of OBERHOFFEN (R 1120). Following identifications were reported: 457 Grenadier Regiment on 19 February at R 0524; 477 Grenadier Regiment on 23 February at R 0922; 257 Engineer Battalion on 18 February at R 0324; while 466 Grenadier Regiment has been out of contact since 13 February. Still attached to the division are Battle Groups HARTIG and HELDMANN as well as I Battalion, 2 SS Police Regiment. Combat infantry strength, including attachments 2,000.

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905 Mobilization Division (CG: ) is rather lightly committed in the sector from R 1120 to the Rhine, with only Battalion SCHMIDT and TREUTLER and elements of 2 SS Police Regiment in line. The rest of the units under command of the division are believed to be manning defenses on the east bank of the Rhine or are in reserve. Combat infantry strength of units in line is judged at 800 and of those in reserve, or east of the Rhine, at 700. (Total 1,500 combat infantry effectives.)

(2) Nineteenth German Army (CG: Lt. Gen. RASP)

This army has lost at least one of the divisions it had under its command in the ALSACE Pocket, since 2 Mountain Division was contacted in the First German Army area. This would leave Nineteenth Army with 16, 159, 189 and 708 Volksgrenadier Divisions; 198, 338 and 716 Infantry Divisions; and 106 Panzer Brigade. The departure of LXIII Corps is accepted. The continued presence of LXIV Corps with 198 Infantry, 716 Infantry, and 708 Volksgrenadier Divisions in the OFFENBURG area is a strong probability. It must be presumed that the refitting of these divisions is progressing and that they will be capable of limited action in the near future. Recent estimates made on the basis of more detailed interrogation agree substantially with previous estimates that not more than 4,000 enemy combat infantry effectives escaped from the ALSACE Pocket. It is confirmed that 90% of the artillery effectives and 75% of the artillery pieces crossed the Rhine. This figure is equivalent to 3,600 men and 90 artillery pieces. Losses sustained by service and anti-aircraft units, are believed to have been negligible. Of armored units, 40 tanks and assault guns are believed to have escaped.

16 Volksgrenadier Division (CO: Col. MOECKEL) remains unlocated though an unconfirmed agent report places it in the FREIBURG (V 0832) TUTTLINGEN (W 8032) area. Combat infantry strength is estimated at 500.

159 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Brig. Gen. BUERCKY) is not yet located definitely, though it is also reported in the FREIBURG-TUTTLINGEN area. Combat infantry effectives are 400.

189 Volksgrenadier Division (CO: Lt. Col. TUNGE) is another division that may be in the FREIBURG-TUTTLINGEN area. One unconfirmed report names the Eastern front as the division's ultimate destination. Combat infantry effectives total 300 men.

338 Infantry Division (CO: Col. EWART) is the fourth division reported in the FREIBURG-TUTTLINGEN area by the same source. Its combat infantry effectives are believed to number 400.

106 Panzer Brigade (CO: ) has been refitting for some twenty days. It will be remembered that only about one half the unit was committed in the VOSGES Pocket. Therefore, its early appearance on some other sector of the front is to be expected.

(a) LXIV Corps (CG: Lt. Gen. THUMM) continues its rehabilitation in the area East and North of OFFENBURG.

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198 Infantry Division (CO: Col. BARTEL). According to a captured division order entitled "Organization Order Number 2", dated 18 January, the division was to be reorganized immediately, according to the Table of Organization of Infantry Division 1945. In order to bring about this reorganization, the following changes were to take place, the supply units were to be drastically reduced and the personnel thus made available to be used as combat troops. All assault rifles were to be concentrated in one platoon per company. The overstrength in assault rifles will be available for the regimental heavy companies. Each regiment is to form one heavy company (4 Company) which would comprise all light guns, medium mortars and heavy machine guns. In case of a surplus of these weapons, they were to be used to form the cadre for a second heavy company (8 Company). The thirteenth (Infantry Gun) companies would be completed with the acquisition of heavy (120 mm) mortars as infantry guns are presently not available. However, the necessary training for handling the guns due to arrive would begin immediately in order to have trained crews when the weapons were delivered.

The fusilier battalion was to become an infantry battalion and the designation "squadron" for the first company was to be dropped as the mobility of this battalion would depend on the number of bicycles which could be provided.

The existing motor transport of the division was to be reduced so as to correspond with the new Table of Equipment. It was inferred that 198 Infantry Division possessed more vehicles than permitted by the new T. O. and was to give up the surplus. This plan did not go into effect in January as the heavy commitment of the division precluded any major organizational changes. However, it can be assumed that, now that the division is being rehabilitated, this reorganization will take place according to the order outlined above. The division is located east of OFFENBURG (W 1585) with left-over combat infantry effectives from ALSACE numbering 500.

708 Volksgrenadier Division (CO: Col. BLECKWENN) is still carried in its initial assembly area north of HASLACH (W 2664). Combat infantry effectives is estimated at 400.

716 Infantry Division (CO: Col. HAFNER) is presumed to have stayed in its assembly area in the vicinity of KEHL (W 0596). Survivors of the "Pocket" are estimated at 400 combat infantry effectives.

(b) XVIII SS Corps (CG: SS Lt. Gen. REINFARTH or ROTH)

Its operational status remains unchanged.

c. DEFENCE COMMAND OBERRHEIN (CG: )

No change in status.

405 Reserve Division (CG: Maj. Gen. SEEGER) is responsible for an extensive sector along the Rhine River to the north and south of KEHL (W 0596). The upgrading of this unit to a reserve divisional status is accepted.

30 SS Grenadier Division (CO: Col. SIEGLING) continues to be carried in an uncertain status.

1005 Brigade Staff (CO: ), according to prisoner of war statement, was located in NEUENBURG (V 8713) area and was in command of 7 OBERRHEIN Regiment on 31 January.

805 Mobilization Division (CG: ) like 405 Reserve Division is responsible for a section of the SIEGFRIED Line defenses. The division according to prisoners of war, is composed of three regiments, with three battalions each. The 5 Volkssturm Regiment holds the central sector from V 8844 to V 9130 with its 11, 12, and 20 Volkssturm Battalions. On its right, 3 Russian (Ukrainian) Depot Regiment

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holds from V 8844 to V 9457. The number of the third, a Volkssturm Regiment, is not known, but it holds a sector south of 5 Volkssturm Regiment. Interrogation has established that the 5 Regiment, composed of Volkssturm from BADEN, has a strength of 600-700 combat infantry effectives, equipped with regular infantry weapons.

d. TWENTY-FOURTH ARMY (CG: SS Lt. Gen. HANS SCHMIDT)

Status of this army remains unchanged.

e. 600 Infantry Division (Russian)

A captured document of the LXXIV Corps, dated 17 January 1945 identifies this division as follows: "Cavalry trained Russian non-commissioned officers and men are needed for the formation of a Reconnaissance Battalion for 600 Infantry Division (Russian). It is requested that all cavalry-trained Russian volunteers in your sector, even from German units, be given an opportunity of applying for transfer to the 600 Infantry Division (Russian). The number of those volunteers is to be reported to this office and the volunteers are to be transferred to the 600 Infantry Division (Russian). Training Camp, Munsingen".

f. ENEMY STRENGTH SIXTH US ARMY GROUP FRONT (Saar-Rhine Front)

Units in Contact and Divisional Reserve:  
(Combat Infantry Effectives)

Saar-Palatinate Front	20,000
Rhine Front	4,000

Reserves:

Estimated Reserves; Saar-Palatinate Front	5,000
Estimated Reserves; Black Forest	7,000

T O T A L

36,000

Artillery Guns:

Saar-Palatinate Front	600 pieces
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Tank and SP Guns:

Saar Palatinate Front	140-160
Reserves on Saar-Palatinate Front	30- 50
Rhine River Front	20

T O T A L

190-230

3. SIXTH US ARMY GROUP FRONT (Alpine Front)

At the close of the period the enemy front lines opposite the Sixth US Army Group on the Alpine front were as follows: ALBERTVILLE (Z 1683), BOURG S MAURICE (Z 4680), BONNEVAL SUR ARC (H 5676), MODANE (K 4132), M TABOR (K 3022), AIGUILLES (N 3703), S QUEYRAS (N 4394), PONDAMINE (N 5050), ST SAUVEUR (N 4823), S MARTIN VESUBIE (N 6020), GRIMALDI (S 8088), MONTGENEVRE (K 4602).

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a. Enemy Disposition

The enemy has not materially changed his dispositions along the Alpine Front during the present period. There are indications that local reliefs within the units of 5 Mountain Division have taken place. A further infusion of Italian elements in forward positions in the passes northeast of MOUNT AIGUILLETTE (N 59) has occurred. The reports of either evacuation or thinning out of the forces under LXXV German Corps 34 Infantry, 5 Mountain, LITTORIO Infantry, and MONTE ROSA Infantry Divisions are still without foundation. However, in the area west of TURIN, two Anti-Aircraft battalions, one light and one heavy, have departed for the east.

b. Enemy Activity

Evidence of the enemy's forward expansion of his northern outpost line is seen in the occupying of positions SW of MONT BLANC at CROIX DU BON HOMME and COL DE FENETRE, giving him observation of the valleys between CONTAMINES and SAINT GERVAIS. In the same area, an ambitious patrol unsuccessfully attempted to destroy the cog-wheel railway at AIGUILLE DU MIDI (C 42) moving over passes better than 3000 meters high

c. General

During March, the prevailing snow conditions and poor communication facilities will prevent assumption of an offensive attitude by the enemy. The present lack of depth in his dispositions is indicative of passive intentions. However, defense of the present positions will continue to be aggressive, with frequent raids for harassing and intelligence purposes.

Enemy combat infantry effectives total approximately 9,000, with a full complement of supporting and auxiliary troops.

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#### 4. OPERATIONS

##### RHINE FRONT

Elements of the miscellaneous units on the east bank of the Rhine continued to send patrols across the river throughout the period. PWs stated that the forces were made up of Volkssturm personnel in large part, usually under command of Wehrmacht or SS officers, with harassing missions only.

On the night of 21 February a force estimated at company strength crossed the river in ten motorboats and raided friendly strongpoints southeast of BALGAU (V 8525). During the raid friendly elements at V 8823 were forced to withdraw temporarily and a strongpoint one Kilometer to the north was surrounded for a short period.

##### NORTH FRONT

From the Rhine to the western HARDT the enemy maintained a completely defensive attitude, reacting to patrol activity especially with artillery fire. Early in the period 250 rounds of Nebelwerfer and heavy artillery fell in the area Q 9028 - Q 8533. SAVERNE (Q 7215) was intermittently shelled by a 380 mm gun, receiving four rounds on 18/19 and three on 23 February.

BITCHE and the area west to Q 6255 were generally quiet. 559 Volksgrenadier Division attempted minor infiltrations east of RIMLING (Q 6355). Elements of 1125 Regiment were unsuccessful in regaining the ground lost earlier in the week by 17 SS Division. An increase in artillery fire was noted east of BLIESBRUCKEN Forest (Q 6255) and was especially marked late in the period near BITCHE after the arrival of elements of 2 Mountain Division.

BOBINGEN (Q 4965) proved strongly held by elements of 19 Infantry Division as at least five tanks were heard in the town. Enemy troops had by the end of the period, entirely withdrawn from BLIESMENGEN (Q 5461). The division fought fiercely, throwing in infantry-tank counterattacks to hold its line in the VORDERWALD Forest (Q 5063), but was forced to withdraw beyond BLIESGERSWILLER (Q 5261) and KLEINBLITTERSDORF (Q 4962). Enemy infiltration attempts in the VORDERWALD woods were unsuccessful.

On the east flank of the 347 Infantry Division's salient resistance was strong, but troops of the 19 Infantry Division were cleared from GROEBLIED - ERSTROFF (Q 4862) and ZINZING (Q 4764) early in the period. The enemy was unable to hold a firm line in the center and withdrew approximately one mile on 20 February, giving up the BRANDENBUSCH woods (Q 4663) and ALSTING (Q 4564). Fierce counterattacks at SPICHEREN (Q 4567) were overcome by 21 February. STIRING-WENDEL (Q 4267) proved heavily defended, but the road between that town and SAARBRUCKEN had been cut as enemy elements were forced from the high ground overlooking SAARBRUCKEN in the vicinity of the ARNVAL woods (Q 4668). On 23 February, 347 Infantry Division elements, reinforced by units of 19 Infantry and 2 Mountain Divisions, made a series of three tank-supported counterattacks in an effort to regain the heights. Volkssturm units from SAARBRUCKEN and one battalion of 719 Infantry Division aided in the defense of FORBACH (Q 3965), as house-to-house fighting continued in the western outskirts at the close of the period.

##### ALPINE FRONT

At the beginning of the period friendly positions at COL DU FREJUS (K 4323) received hostile machine gun fire, as did our patrols to COL DU MONT CENIS. On 19 February an enemy raid on our post at AIGUILLE DE MIDI (C 42) was repulsed as the enemy reacted strongly to our attempt to occupy ROCHE LA CROIX (P 9252). Patrol clashes occurred at BRUILGLACIER (Z 4989) and at LAC DES ROOSSES (H 6353)

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WESTERN FRENCH FORCES

Patrols were fired on during the period in the LA ROCHELLE zone at ANAIS (T 4937) and at (T 5234) as the enemy was observed establishing positions west of PERRIERES where a patrol clash took place on 23 February. Two heavy caliber shells, probably fired from OLERON, landed north of FOURAS (T 3416) on 23 February. A friendly raid at RONCE (Y 2795) netted 7 prisoners of war, a 20 millimeter cannon and a machine gun. 77 millimeter fire (50% duds) fell in the area of GRANDE GORCE (Y 4877) on 20 February.

5. COMMUNICATIONS

A. Tactical Reconnaissance

Reports of scattered military rail and road activity throughout our area indicate that the regrouping and normal supply of enemy forces in BADEN and the SAAR PALATINATE area were continuing. Activity in the Black Forest region centered around FREIBURG and moderately heavy traffic was also seen in the CALW (R 7413) - FREUDENSTADT area on 22 February. Marshalling yards and rail lines in the KARLSRUHE-HEILBRONN-MANNHEIM-LANDAU area revealed considerable activity on 22 February with a westward trend indicated by the observations.

Heavy holdings in the FREIBURG marshalling yards and moderately heavy rail activity in the OFFENBURG-FREIBURG-VILLINGEN triangle on 19 and 20 February suggest that perhaps another unit of the regrouping Nineteenth Army is being assembled prior to transfer to an active sector further to the North. Rail activity in the CALW - FREUDENSTADT area included some military traffic directed to the east with the remainder of the movement going in a southerly direction deep into the Black Forest. These trains moving into the forest may be carrying tired and wounded soldiers to rest centers known to be in the area north of the Swiss Border.

Throughout the Rhine Valley, the movement of military and supply trains coupled with the sizeable concentrations of railroad rolling stock in marshalling yards of the KARLSRUHE-HEILBRONN-MANNHEIM-LANDAU area on 22 February indicated the arrival of some badly needed reinforcements for the SAAR. To the west, unusually light activity prevailed in the SAARBRUCKEN-NEUNKIRCHEN area throughout the period with scattered rail and road movements suggesting normal supply activities for servicing the SIEGFRIED Line installations and formations in that sector. Light rail traffic was also noted in the ST WENDEL-BAD KREUZNACH area on 22 February with scattered trains seen moving in a northeasterly direction.

Observations made during the week reveal no large scale departures or arrivals within the SAAR PALATINATE.

B. Status of Communications

Fighter and medium bombers were especially active throughout the week with mediums concentrating on marshalling yards and railroad stations, while fighters exerted their main effort on railroad lines. Attacks were particularly successful on 22 February when 170 rail cuts were made and 2 bridges destroyed. The majority of these cuts were scored east of the Rhine on lines east from STUTTGART and from MANNHEIM to BASEL. The results of these attacks, coupled with effects of preceding bombings, succeeded in greatly hampering enemy movement along our front.

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Through traffic on the LANDAU-ZWEIBRUCKEN line was temporarily halted. North-South traffic was at a standstill along the OFFENBURG-KARLSRUHE line as a result of the destruction of the RASTATT rail bridges. Traffic was rendered temporarily impossible on North-South lines through BAD MUNSTER because of the successful bombing of the approaches to the rail bridges. East of the Rhine some canalizing of traffic was effected and resulted in an overall slowing down of movement through out the area.

*Eugene L. Harrison*

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Brigadier General, G. S. C.  
A. C. of S., G-2


INCLOSURES

- Inc # 1 - The Rhine Bridges
- Inc # 2 - Enemy Disposition

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# THE RHINE BRIDGES



## -KEY-

- == PERMANENT ROAD BRIDGE
- FLOATING ROAD BRIDGE
- +++ RAIL BRIDGE
- FERRY BRIDGE
- === COMBINATION HIGHWAY-RAIL BRIDGE
- FERRY IN OPERATION

12 Feb - The floating piers used as ferry terminals at this site have been dismantled - broken up into small sections and are seen anchored to East bank at the site.

22 Feb - Ferry no longer in use.

29 1200 A FEB.


ENCL. #1 TO  
WEEKLY INTELL.  
SUM. #23

G-2 6TH ARMY GROUP  
SCALE: 1/500,000





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SCALE 1/1,000,000

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200/FEB 45/6 AG 6055

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ENEMY DISPOSITION  
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G-2 6TH ARMY GROUP  
ENCL. #2 TO  
WEEKLY INTELL. SUM. #23





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
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HEADQUARTERS 6 TH US ARMY GROUP  
Office of the A. C. of S., G-2  
APO 23, U. S. Army

By Authority of  
CG, 6th Army Group  
Initials: *EX*  
Date: 17 Feb 1945

WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NUMBER 22  
FOR THE WEEK ENDING 17 FEBRUARY 1945



1. SUMMARY OF THE ENEMY SITUATION

a. Estimate of the Enemy Situation

The defensive attitude of the enemy on the Sixth US Army Group front has continued. In fact, the low priority of this front leaves him no other choice but to struggle along with only those forces presently available in the area.

Army Group G has undoubtedly assumed full command of the SAAR-PALATINATE-BADEN front, with its boundaries limited on the north by the Moselle River and on the south by the Swiss Border. In addition to the First Army, it now has under control the remaining operational elements of the Nineteenth Army. Its mission remains the same: to provide the mobile forces necessary to maintain the integrity of the SIEGFRIED positional defenses. For this, Army Group G can count only on the immediate rehabilitation of Nineteenth Army's defeated divisions as a reserve, as long as the German High Command appreciates an obviously defensive mission for Sixth US Army Group.

First German Army was forced to compensate for the loss of an armored division by some reorganization within its component formations. It continues to operate on its front from the Moselle to DRUSENHEIM (R 1618) through the following corps: LXXXII Infantry (256 VG and 416 Inf Divs); LXXXV Infantry (719 and 347 Inf Divs); XIII SS (19 VG, 17 SS PG, and 559 VG Divs); XC Infantry (6 SS Mtn and 36 VG Divs); and LXXXIX Infantry (47 VG, 257 VG, and 905 zbV Divs). Train movements indicate the arrival of an unidentified formation of divisional size, which may turn out to be 2 Mountain Division. On the other hand, the departure of 11 Panzer Division has impaired the fighting efficiency of the First Army to a considerable extent. In this emergency, the creation of reserves became a paramount necessity. The weak 245 Infantry Division moved out of line where it could be rehabilitated and serve simultaneously as Army reserve. The divisions in the line created sector reserves by thinning out the elements in contact, except where the immediate threat was obvious. The reorganization of two-regiment divisions on a three-regiment/two battalion basis afforded ease of maneuver for this redeployment, while three-regiment divisions merely moved one regiment out of contact. In addition, Volksgrenadier Divisions have made fuller use of the organic anti-tank battalion's 14 SP guns by employing them consistently in a counterattacking role. This tactical redeployment has resulted in an enemy capability to effect immediate, if limited, shock action against attempted penetrations especially in sectors where the objective is apparent or to which the approach is canalized by terrain features. Where GHQ mobile formations are available, the enemy can still make initial penetration of his defenses most difficult.

Nineteenth German Army has apparently assumed operational control of the mobile units east of the Rhine. Some documentary evidence and observation of train movements indicate two general assembly areas. LXIV Corps has moved northward toward KEHL with 708 Volksgrenadier, 716 Infantry and 198 Infantry Divisions. In the BADENWEILER (V 9513) area, XVIII SS Corps may have taken the place of the apparently defunct LXIII Corps. Of the remaining units, there is slight evidence for northward movement of 106 Panzer Brigade and 2 Mountain Division, the latter probably into First Army's area.

No change has been noted in the status of OBERRHAIN Defense Command, except for the probable transition of XVIII SS Corps from a purely administrative to an operational function. The presence of Nineteenth Army Headquarters in the area has relieved the Defense Command of any operational duties it may have had. Twenty-fourth Army remains in control of the Swiss border region.

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*Subj. Declassified with the records*  
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b. Capabilities

The reorganization of First Army mentioned above has not effectively increased its overall defensive capability. The enemy is making the most of his long experience in defensive tactics to stave off the eventual breakthrough. Along the entire Army Group G front his defensive role daily becomes less a capability and more an inescapable necessity.

2. SIXTH US ARMY GROUP FRONT (Saar-Rhine Front)

a. At the close of the period the front lines of enemy forces opposing Sixth US Army Group were as follows: VOIKLINGEN (Q 3573), FORBACH (Q 3965), SARREGUEMINES (Q 5056), RIMLING (Q 6555), BITCHE (Q 7650), ALTHORN (Q 7540), HAGUENAU (R 0424), DRUSENHEIM (R 1517), South along Rhine River to the Swiss Border.

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THE ENEMY STRENGTH FIGURE GIVEN IN SIXTH US ARMY GROUP WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARIES ALWAYS REPRESENTS THE COMBAT INFANTRY EFFECTIVES, UNLESS QUALIFIED. IT INCLUDES ALL PERSONNEL OF THE UNIT INFANTRY OR PANZER GRENADIER REGIMENTS, THE RECONNAISSANCE OR FUSILIER BATTALION, THE REINFORCEMENT BATTALION, AND THE COMBAT ENGINEER BATTALION, SUPPORTING OR AUXILIARY TROOPS ARE NOT COUNTED IN THE COMBAT INFANTRY EFFECTIVE STRENGTH, SINCE ESTIMATION OF THEIR STRENGTH MUST USUALLY BE CONJECTURAL AND WITHOUT EVEN THE DOUBTFUL BASIS OF THE NUMBER OF KNOWN CASUALTIES AND INTERROGATION REPORTS. IT IS ALWAYS ASSUMED THAT A PROPORTIONATE NUMBER OF SUPPORTING TROOPS, BOTH DIVISIONAL AND GHQ, ARE TO BE ADDED IN ORDER TO ARRIVE AT A FIGURE REPRESENTING THE ENEMY'S OVERALL COMBAT STRENGTH.

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b. ARMY GROUP G (CG: SS General HAUSSER)

Higher Headquarters reports that the recently promoted Oberstgruppenfuhrer (Gen) HAUSSER probably commands Army Group G, replacing General BLASKOWITZ, repeatedly reported assuming responsibilities on the Eastern front.

(1) First German Army (CG: Lt. Gen. OBSTFELDER)

The First Army continued to readjust and organize its defensive positions with 12 Divisions in line between the Moselle and the Rhine and two divisions in reserve.

245 Infantry Division (Acting CO: Col. WAGNER) has not been identified satisfactorily since 31 January. It was squeezed out of line by 36 and 47 Volksgrenadier Divisions. The division was withdrawn from line for refitting and at the same time is to serve as Army reserve. The division's strength is 2,000 combat infantry effectives.

Unidentified Division. Heavy military railroad traffic was revealed by tactical reconnaissance to be moving into First German Army area during the early days of the period. The arrival of a divisional formation is accepted on the basis of these train movements. The current situation and the direction of rail traffic make it probable that the unit is one of those formerly under Nineteenth Army.

(a) LXXXII Corps (CG: Maj. Gen. HAHM)

256 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Brig. Gen. FRANZ) committed its three organic regiments about 10 February in completing the relief of 11 Panzer Division. Conflicting identifications obscure the precise divisional sector and, for the present, it can only be stated that 256 and 416 Divisions are responsible for the line from the MOSELLE to MERZIG (Q 2095). 256 Volksgrenadier Division was able to replace some of the losses incurred at BITCHE in January, but its refitting was incomplete and the division is still under strength. Combat infantry strength is estimated at about 2,000.

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416 Infantry Division (CG: Maj. Gen. PFLIEGER). As mentioned above, this division shares the MOSELLE-MERZIG (Q 2095) sector with 256 Volksgrenadier Division. The division was in close contact during the period and suffered casualties in several engagements. Combat infantry strength is estimated at 3,500.

11 Panzer Division (CG: Maj. Gen. von WIETERSHEIM). Last contact was made on 10 February. The division is accepted as being out of line. Higher Headquarters and Tac-Reports suggest that the division has crossed the Moselle River and is entraining for a new destination. Combat infantry strength was estimated at 4,000 men supported by 50 tanks.

(b) LXXXV Corps (CG: Lt. Gen. KNISS)

719 Infantry Division (CG: Brig. Gen. GAEDE) continued to hold the line from MERZIG (Q 2095) to SAARLAUTERN (Q 2880). 743 Grenadier Regiment was identified at Q 2981 on 13 February; other elements of the division were met at Q 2880 on 15 February. Combat infantry strength is unchanged at 4,500.

347 Infantry Division (CG: Maj. Gen. TRIERENBERG) remained inactive throughout the period in its old sector from SAARLAUTERN (Q 2880) to FORBACH (Q 4263). The following identifications were made: 860 Grenadier Regiment, on 10 February in the vicinity of Q 3568, on 15 February vicinity Q 3369; 880 Grenadier Regiment, on 10 February in the vicinity of Q 3863, on 16 February vicinity Q 4063; 861 Grenadier Regiment is unidentified since 30 January. Some replacements were received from the BERLIN area on 5 February. Prisoners confirmed the absence of heavy weapons companies in the battalions of this unit. A similar lack was reported by prisoners from 559 Volksgrenadier Division. The 1945 Infantry Division Table of Organization provides for concentration of heavy weapons from the rifle companies into the heavy weapons companies of the battalions and the regiment. Possible explanations for the prisoner statements may be the use of the heavy weapons companies either as divisional reserve or in static fortified positions, while the rifle companies continue to be employed in the front line. Combat infantry strength is now carried at 2,400.

(c) XIII SS Corps (CG: SS Maj. Gen. MAX SIMON)

19 Infantry Division (CG: Brig. Gen. BRITZELMAYR) remained in very loose contact from FORBACH (Q 4263) to Q 5957. The only units identified during the period were 73 Grenadier Regiment at Q 5758 on 11 February and 74 Grenadier Regiment at Q 5057 on 16 February. Including the Battle Group KLEIN, combat infantry effectives are estimated at 1,700.

17 SS Panzer Grenadier Division (CO: Col. KLINGENBERG) holds the line from Q 5957 to Q 7453. Identifications were as follows: 37 SS Panzer Grenadier Regiment at Q 7055 on 11 February and Q 6657 on 15 February; 38 SS Panzer Grenadier Regiment at Q 7541 on 11 February, at Q 6154 on 12 February, at Q 5957 and Q 6256 on 15 February, and at Q 6555 on 16 February; 17 SS Panzer Battalion (Assault Gun) at Q 6555 on 16 February; 17 SS Reconnaissance Battalion in the vicinity of Q 5953 on 16 February. The division offered initially weak resistance against our attack on RIMLING (Q 6555) on 15 February, but rallied later to stage a counterattack with armored support in an unsuccessful attempt to reestablish their line. The division lost seven self propelled guns in these operations.

Prisoner statements exemplify the efforts of German units on this front to cope with the situation with only their presently allotted means. The Assault Gun battalion, organized on a basis of a headquarters company plus three 15 SP gun companies, was held in reserve well behind the line for employment only in counterattacks. The Reconnaissance battalion has a headquarters company plus 4 companies and includes amphibious jeeps. Some of the Artillery battalions are horse drawn. The formation of a reserve within each rifle company was standard practice before they went into action.

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There were no indications of further reinforcements for the division during the period. On the basis of known casualties, division combat infantry strength is reduced to 2,300, supported by 40 SP guns.

559 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Brig. Gen. von MUEHLEN) holds a sector from southwest of BITCHE (Q 7750) to Q 7545. Contact during the week was sporadic and the division maintained its generally passive attitude. Identifications were as follows: 1126 Volksgrenadier Division at Q 7446 on 14 February; 1127 Volksgrenadier Regiment at Q 7448 on 12 February and at Q 7449 on 16 February. No replacements were received recently and the division is well below T/O strength, with combat infantry effectives numbering approximately 2,200.

(d) XC Corps (CG: )

6 SS Mountain Division "Nord" (CG: SS Maj. Gen. BRENNER) continued an alert defense of its broad sector from Q 7443 to Q 8433 through the HARDT Mountains. Lack of recent contact with 12 Mountain Regiment and identification of the Reconnaissance Battalion in the old regimental sector suggests that this regiment is in reserve. The following identifications were made during the period: 11 SS Mountain Regiment on 12 February vicinity Q 7639, and on 16 February at Q 7440; 12 SS Mountain Regiment on 10 February vicinity Q 7937; 6 SS Mountain Reconnaissance Battalion on 11 February vicinity Q 8337; 506 SS Panzer Grenadier Battalion, on 13 February vicinity Q 8434. Prisoners report that 6 SS Field Replacement Battalion is training 600 men in the rear areas. These reinforcements have arrived from an Austrian Mountain Replacement Battalion. PW's state that a small number of replacements have also been received by I/11 SS Mountain Regiment from 7 SS Mountain Division "Prinz EUGEN" in southeast Europe. Including the Field Replacement Battalion division combat infantry strength is estimated at 2,500.

36 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Brig Gen. WELLM) was in light contact in its old sector from Q 8433 to Q 9228. PW's stated that the division CP was located at Q 932391. Only identifications were: 165 Volksgrenadier Regiment on 11 February vicinity Q 8630; 36 Engineer Battalion on 12 February vicinity Q 9128. There is no further news of the battalions supposedly reforming at BAUMHOLDER. The division is operating 2 regiments on line, with II Battalion/ 87 Grenadier Regiment and I Battalion/165 Grenadier Regiment forming one regiment (probably under command of 165 Regiment staff) and 118 Grenadier Regiment the other. The strength of this weak division amounts to approximately 1,700 combat infantry effectives, including 51 German Air Force Fortress Battalion.

(e) LXXXIX Corps (CG: Lt. Gen. HOEHNE)

47 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Maj. Gen. BORK) was relatively inactive throughout the period. Contact was made with 104 Grenadier Regiment on 14 February at Q 9527 and 115 Grenadier Regiment in vicinity of Q 9826 on 12, 15, and 16 February. The divisional sector remained unchanged, from Q 9228 to R 0225. Combat infantry effectives continue to be estimated at 1,500.

257 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Brig. Gen. SEIDEL) had a busy week in the OBERHOFFEN (R 0920) area, putting up a stubborn defense against repeated Allied assaults. All three regiments were in close contact during the period, with last identifications as follows: 457 Volksgrenadier Regiment on 14 February vicinity R 0424; 466 Volksgrenadier Regiment on 13 February at R 0921; 477 Volksgrenadier Regiment in OBERHOFFEN area. The division holds a line from R 0225 to R 1120. It was reported to have 9 assault guns left in 1257 Assault Gun Company. Of particular interest is the prisoner statement that a divisional mortar company, equipped with 15 X 120 mm mortars, was organized in January with personnel and armament from the regimental 13th companies. Battalions HARTIG and HELDMANN, formerly under 17 SS Division, were identified in support of 257 Division on 11 February. Approximately 250 replacements were received through 257 Field Replacement Battalion. However, losses in prisoners and other casualties more than offset this increase in combat infantry effectives are now judged to be 1,600 plus 300 for the two attached battalions.

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905 Mobilization Division presumably remained in charge of the diverse units listed last week. Of these, Battalions SCHMIDT and TREUTLER of 2 Grenadier Regiment Oberrhein (MARBACH) were identified at DRUSENHEIM (R 1518) on 10 February. Prisoners of war taken from the division confirm previous statements that the units responsibility includes a sector on the east bank of the Rhine River, though the limits of the sector are not yet clear. Combat infantry effectives are estimated at 1,500.

(2) Nineteenth German Army (CG: Lt. Gen. RASP)

At the time of its retreat across the Rhine, this army included 16, 159, 189, 708 Volksgrenadier Divisions, 198, 338, 716 Infantry Divisions and 2 Mountain Division as well as 106 Panzer Brigade. The army appears to have been allotted two assembly areas, one in the vicinity of FREIBURG-MUELLHEIM-SCHONAU, and the other east of OFFENBURG. Rehabilitation and regrouping of these units is continuing.

LXIII Corps (CG: Maj. Gen. ABRAHAM)

Strong negative information indicates that this corps has no longer any operational functions under Nineteenth Army.

16 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Maj. Gen. HAECKEL) is still unlocated after its retreat across the Rhine. Permanent casualties are now estimated at 61 Officers and 1,751 enlisted men killed, captured or severely wounded. Scattered elements of all divisional units are believed to have extricated themselves from the pocket. However, remaining combat infantry effectives do not exceed 400 men.

159 Infantry Division (CG: Brig. Gen. BUERCKY) is unlocated at present. However, it may be in the area south of FREIBURG. The permanent casualties suffered by the division totaled 43 Officers and 2,997 enlisted men. Combat infantry strength is estimated at 400.

189 Infantry Division (CO: Lt. Col. JUNGE) is unlocated, but it too is probably in the area south of FREIBURG. Known permanent casualties suffered by the division totaled 34 Officers and 1,609 enlisted men. Combat infantry effectives are estimated at 300.

338 Infantry Division (CO: Col. EWART). The disposition of this divisional unit is not known. The division suffered permanent casualties totaling 55 Officers and 2,300 enlisted men. Combat infantry strength is estimated at 400 effectives.

2 Mountain Division (CG: Brig. Gen. DEGEN) is believed to have moved into the SAAR-PALATINATE area during the present period. The division had been previously reported doing police duty along the western fringes of the Black Forest. Prior to its escape from the COLMAR area the division suffered the highest losses of any unit under Nineteenth Army control. A permanent casualty total of 62 Officers and 6,026 enlisted personnel includes 4,764 registered prisoners of war. It is estimated that the maximum number of personnel evacuated from the COLMAR pocket amounts to 4,000 of all the arms and services, including attached units.

106 Panzer Brigade (CO: ) managed to evacuate the pocket in fairly good order. Its present location is believed to be in the area ETTENHEIM (W 0662) - MAHLBERG (W 0666). Its tank strength is estimated to be approximately 20 vehicles, including repaired tanks known to have been in the shops at FREIBURG.

(a) LXIV Corps (CG: Lt. Gen. THUMM) crossed the Rhine River in the NEUF BREISACH area and then moved to its assembly area East and North of OFFENBURG. The rehabilitation of this corps is presently taking place.

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198 Infantry Division (CO: Col. BARTEL) evacuated its divisional headquarters in the pocket on about 1/2 February, leaving only some elements to fight rear guard actions. It then moved to its assembly area East of OFFENBURG. The division had been in a weakened condition prior to the launching of the Allied offensive. During the action the division suffered 1,487 permanent casualties including 17 Officers. Its present combat infantry strength is 500 effectives.

708 Infantry Division (CO: Col. BLECKWENN) after its evacuation of the VOSGES Pocket on 3 February, moved up into its assembly area North of HASLACH. The division suffered 1,489 permanent casualties, including 40 Officers. Latest information indicates that its combat infantry effectives total 500.

716 Infantry Division (CO: Col. HAFFNER) has been located by a captured document in the area of KEHL. The permanent casualties suffered in the pocket totaled 1,724, including 18 Officers. No positive evidence has been received of reinforcements having been sent to this division. Combat infantry effectives are estimated at 300.

(b) XVIII SS Corps (CG: SS Lt. Gen. REINEFARTH or ROTH)

This corps has been probably forced into an operational role under Nineteenth Army from its former purely administrative functions under Defence Command OBERRHEIN. This change in status has been brought about by the need of corps headquarters under the army to tactically control those divisions ordinarily controlled by the departed or defunct LXIII Corps. Its operational headquarters are in the vicinity of BADENWEILER (V 9513).

c. DEFENCE COMMAND OBERRHEIN (CG: )

No change in status.

405 zbV Division (CG: Maj. Gen. SEEGER). A deserter states that this unit was to have been upgraded to a reserve division during the first days of February according to orders issued by the divisional commander. The new regimental numbers were to be 10, 12, and 14, and the present Landesschutzen and Guard Battalions were to form these units. The division was to come under the administrative control of XIV SS Corps. Its present area of operations north and south of KEHL was not to be affected by the reorganization.

30 SS Grenadier Division (CO: Col. SIEGLING) continued existence of the division is doubted.

805 Mobilization Division. The division appears to have the dual function of providing replacements for combat units and also administering defensive units manning the SIEGFRIED Line.

(a) XIV Corps (CG: SS Lt. Gen. von dem BACH-ZELEWSKI)

Its administrative status remains unchanged.

d. TWENTY-FOURTH ARMY (CG: Lt. Gen. HANS SCHMIDT)

It performs defensive duties along the Swiss Frontier from the left flank of Army Group G to the BODEN SEE. Its headquarters are at ENGEL (W 7717).

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ENEMY SITUATION WITH US ARMY GROUP FRONT (Saar-Rhine Front)

Units in Contact and Divisional Reserve:  
(Combat Infantry Effectives)

Seventh US Army	21,000
First French Army	4,000

Reserves:

Estimated Reserves in SAAR	7,000
Estimated Reserves in Black Forest	9,000

T O T A L	41,000
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Artillery Guns:

Seventy US Army	625
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Tanks and SP Guns:

Seventh US Army Front	130-150
Reserves on Seventh US Army Front (653 Anti-Tank Bn)	30- 50
First French Army Front	20- 30

T O T A L	180-230
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3. SIXTH US ARMY GROUP FRONT (Alpine Front)

At the close of the period the enemy front lines opposite the Sixth US Army Group on the Alpine front were as follows: ALBERTVILLE (Z 1683), BOURG S MAURICE (Z 4680), BONNEVAL SUR ARC (H 5676), MODANE (K 4132), M TABOR (K 3022), AIGULLES (N 3703), S QUEYRAS (N 4394), PONDAMINE (N 5050), ST SAUVEUR (N 4823), S MARTIN VESUBIE (N 6020), GRIMALDI (S 8088), MONTGENEVRE (K 4602).

a. Enemy Disposition

No confirmation of major changes in enemy disposition has been reported. The 34 German Infantry Division and elements of 5 German Mountain Division are still committed on the Alpine Front. In addition to the LITTORIO and MONTE ROSA Divisions occupying the central and northern sectors of the Alpine Front, ground forces reported that the SAN MARCO Division may relieve elements of the 34 German Infantry Division. However, no indications of such a move have been received.

b. Enemy Strength

The lack of positive information on the strength of Italian troops renders an estimate of forces holding the Alpine front difficult. It is conservatively estimated that the total does not exceed 10-12,000, with 60% carried as combat effectives.

4. OPERATIONS

RHINE FRONT

Throughout the period, enemy forces evidenced considerable anxiety over friendly intentions and troop dispositions along the entire Rhine Front. Daily patrols varied in aggressiveness from mere nuisance raids to penetrations of several kilometers. On one attempt, they were content to machine gun friendly positions from

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boats in mid-Rhine, but late in the period a surprise attack in the vicinity of V 8506 succeeded in taking some eight friendly prisoners. The usual harassing artillery fire and aerial reconnaissance were observed and in the area FREIBURG - FELDKIRCH (Q 9227) heavy vehicular activity was noticeable.

Prisoners stated that fear of an attack from the STRASBOURG area, which the enemy believes has been reinforced, was the basis for the civilian evacuation from many towns in the KEHL-WITTENWEIT (R 0170) area. Reports were also received that some pill boxes in the KEHL sector had to be abandoned by the enemy due to the rise of the Rhine.

#### NORTH FRONT

At the beginning of the period, elements of 905 zbV Division supported by armor stubbornly resisted the friendly advance against DRUSENHEIM (R 1618). At the same time, 257 Infantry Division succeeded in strengthening its position near OBERHOFFEN (R 0820) and in cutting the north-south road at R 0920. The town was finally taken on 13 February after severe fighting, including house to house action, but the enemy continued to oppose friendly attempts at debouchment with intense small arms fire. Flooding by the Moder River in the HAGUENAU area impeded friendly operations, as 47 Volksgrenadier Division reacted alertly at BISCHOLTZ (Q 8532) and joined with 36 Volksgrenadier Division in repulsing friendly patrols at BITSCHOFFEN (Q 9128). The latter unit was reported to be preparing a secondary line of defence between ENGUILLER (Q 9131) and GUMBRECHTSHOFFEN (Q 9234), having requested for this purpose 29,000 mines in addition to the daily production of 60 from a sawmill at Q 9233, operated by the engineers.

In the eastern HARDT Mountains, 6 SS Mountain Division held commanding ground in its sector with the minimum number of troops. Patrols from 11 SS Mountain Regiment were unsuccessful in their attempt to take prisoners in the WILDENGUTH (Q 7837) area.

Heavy caliber artillery fire increased considerably by the end of the period with concentrations falling on the bridge at BISCHWILLER (R 1018) and on the towns of OBERMODERN (Q 8527) and PFAFFENHOFFEN (Q 8927) as well as BRUMATH (Q 9614) which received some 240 mm fire. A concentration of 20 rounds of railroad artillery fire fell on SAVERNE (Q 7215) during the night of 16/17 February.

West of the HARDT Mountains, activity was negligible early in the period. The URBACH (Q 7055), BLIESBRUCK (Q 5957) area was being manned in increased force but operations in the BITCHE area found 559 Infantry Division holding an extended sector. On 15/16 February our limited objective attack against RIMLING (Q 6535) and GUIDERSKIRCH (Q 6656) met only spotty resistance. The next day, 17 SS Panzer Grenadier Division counter attacked twice: first with 100 infantry, which was broken up by artillery fire; and later in the area northwest of RIMLING with 200 infantry supported by 10 tanks/SP guns. This offensive penetrated to the Moronville Farm (Q 6455) before the attack was contained and the line restored by friendly forces. At the end of the period, 15-20 bunkers in the BLIESBRUCKEN Woods area (Q 5956) manned by 4-5 men each continued to resist with small arms fire. Some armor was reported regrouping north of RIMLING possibly for another counterattack. To the north, 19 Infantry Division prisoners were taken from a strong point at HANWEILER (Q 5157) on 16/17 February and the right flank of the division was pressed back east of FORBACH.

Enemy losses in these attempts to restore and maintain their lines west of the HARDT Mountains totalled approximately 1,000 prisoners of war and 20 tanks/SP guns destroyed or damaged.

#### ALPINE FRONT

At the beginning of the period infantry activity was noted in the area of PETIT ST BERNARD (C 40) and BRIANCONNAIS (P 49). Twenty-one Italians occupying ROCHE LA CROIX Gap (N 48) deserted to French troops on 14 February. At the close of the period an enemy outpost reoccupied the village of OUVES (K 4).

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## WESTERN FRENCH FORCES

In the LA ROCHELLE zone, enemy patrols were active throughout the period in areas T 4928-4937 as vehicle traffic was heard in the vicinity of R 4346. Five Polish deserters were taken in the area on the 14/15 February as a large explosion was heard in the East sector. On POINTE DE GRAVE loud explosions were heard several times during the period and vehicle movement was observed on the roads Y 3856-3650 and Y 3654-3755. Flares seen on ROYAN on 12/13 February were followed by several volleys of small arms fire. At the end of the period enemy aircraft were sighted over ROYAN.

### 5. COMMUNICATIONS

#### A Tactical Reconnaissance

With front line activities at a minimum, movements in rear areas highlighted the extensive coverage flown throughout the week. Heavy activity persisted on all days during the period except for the 15th and 16th when a marked decrease in the amount and tempo of movement was evident. The Black Forest area revealed considerable activity this week, probably representing replacements for the remnants of the Nineteenth Army. The northerly movement of one unit of the Nineteenth Army may be connected with movements along the Rhine Valley from FREIBURG to KARLSRUHE and the westward movement of trains over the Rhine into the Saar.

Roads and railroads throughout the Black Forest were extensively used, as remnants of the badly mauled Nineteenth Army moved to assembly areas and regrouping points along the FREIBURG - OFFENBURG - VILLINGEN line. Because of rail interdiction on lines running due north of OFFENBURG, traffic away from the area was, of necessity, re-routed through the very active centers of KARLSRUHE and HEIDELBERG, thence into the SAAR-PALATINATE.

Such a routing would account for only a part of the activity noted along the lines running west from the Rhine toward KAISERSLAUTERN and NEUNKIRCHEN. It must be borne in mind that a large part of the activity in the SAAR is directly connected with the still-operating industrial centers in this area. In this regard it is of interest to note that a large percentage of the trains seen in the KAISERSLAUTERN-NEUNKIRCHEN-SAARBRUCKEN area were made up of coal cars, gondolas, flats, and box-cars. Very likely much of the southbound movement from WORMS and DARMSTADT toward MANNHEIM and HEIDELBERG is intimately connected with this industrial traffic. The concentration of 1000 flat cars at MANNHEIM and much rolling stock in other marshaling yards along the Rhine Valley on the 16th of February represents a collection of stock from the SAAR-PALATINATE after the completion of military and commercial movements into that area.

Signs of continued military departures from our front were evident in the activity noted along the LANDAU-NEUSTADT-SPEYER and KARLSRUHE-DARMSTADT lines on the 13th and 14th of February. The trend of military movements along these lines was generally northward indicating that some of these military trains may be headed for points north of the MAINZ area.

#### B Status of Communications

Capitalizing on the unusually good flying weather afforded them during the latter half of the current period, Allied aircraft flew a record number of sorties attacking marshalling yards, railroad centers, rail lines, road and rail bridges. A total of 92 locomotives and 1617 rail cars were destroyed. 147 rail cuts were scored causing marked delays and making re-routings necessary on many lines throughout the Rhine Valley and in the Black Forest area. Fresh cuts on the KARLSRUHE-FREIBURG, STUTTGART - TUTTLINGEN, and the SCHWETZINGEN - KARLSRUHE lines further hampered communications. The destruction of 3 more rail bridges along the Rhine Valley added to the difficulties of transportation.

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The unserviceable bridges at BAD MUNSTER (M 0835) continue to render the BAD KREUZNACH-KAISERSLAUTERN line unusable while the destroyed bridges in the RASTATT area prevent through traffic on the OFFENBURG-KARLSRUHE line.

Indications are that the twin lines from MANNHEIM to KARLSRUHE carry a major portion of the traffic along the eastern bank of the Rhine. Observations suggest that movement on the easternmost parallel line is usually routed north while the western line carries southbound traffic.

#### 6. DEFENSES

German intentions to hold the Rhine Plain and deny us access through the Black Forest are indicated by the scope of the digging activities on the East side of the Rhine. The section of the 1/25,000 overprinted map attached as enclosure No. 3, shows a typical sector of the Rhine defenses 10 Km south of STRASBOURG.

The pattern followed seems to be an adaptation of the principle of "Coffered" coastal defense, already used extensively in the coastal defenses of North Italy.

This system entails the construction of a first line of defense to deter or delay a landing, with a second line several miles inland where it is hoped to halt it. At right angle to these, but connecting them, are obstacles: streams, canals, A/T ditches or fire trenches aimed at preventing lateral movement, thereby isolating the field of action of any thrust.

In this case, the SIEGFRIED pillboxes and casemates on the immediate banks of the Rhine constitute the first line of defense. It is hoped to check any successful penetration through these at the line of fire trenches supported by additional pillboxes and artillery.

This system of multiple interconnected lines of fire trenches has the added advantage of permitting surprise opening of fire from alternate positions. Thus, troops subjected to a preparatory artillery barrage can take refuge in any one of the original position. This trench network is further strengthened by being anchored on towns which have been turned into strongpoints by the construction of perimeter defenses.

This digging is in progress from BASLE to KARLSRUHE, and it is estimated from air cover that 600 Km. of fire trenches and 250 Km. of communication trenches have been dug since early December.

*Eugene L. Harrison*

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Brigadier General, G. S. C.  
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#### INCLOSURES

##### Appendix "A"

- #1 Inc - The Rhine Bridges
- #2 Inc - Enemy Disposition
- #3 Inc - Defense Overprint

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APPENDIX "A" TO WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY #22.

WEATHER CONDITIONS ALONG THE UPPER RHINE VALLEY  
FOR MARCH

GENERAL

Although February is the best Winter month for air operations in this area, conditions in March present an improvement insofar as ground activities are concerned. In spite of a general increase in precipitation, there are fewer overcast days in March and much less snowfall and snowcover. A general increase in temperature, better soil conditions, and a longer daily period of daylight and sunlight are to be expected.

TEMPERATURE

Average temperatures along the Rhine Valley and in Southwestern and Western Germany for March are about 5 degrees warmer than for February. In the Black Forest the mean minimums remain below freezing, but in the warmer Rhine Valley itself mean minimums are in most instances 32 degrees or above. Mean monthly temperatures are above 41 degrees along the Rhine from just north of Basel to just north of Strasbourg, slightly colder (37 to 41) to Karlsruhe, and warmer than 41 north of Karlsruhe. East of Freiburg, mean temperatures drop sharply to 34 degrees in the mountain regions.

MEAN TEMPERATURES FOR MARCH

Rhine Valley		
	Baden	40.0
	Basel	40.8
	Metz	41.0
	Strasbourg	41.2
	Karlsruhe	41.2
	Freiburg	42.0
Black Forest		
	Villingen	31.8
	Donaueschingen	34.0
	Freudenstadt	35.0
Western (Central) Germany		
	Ulm	37.5
	Augsburg	38.0
	Nurnberg	39.0
	Stuttgart	42.0

PRECIPITATION

There is a general increase of precipitation over all of the area. In the mountainous regions east of Freiburg and Baden, mean monthly precipitation increases sharply to over 6.0 inches, in contrast to less than 2.4 inches for the most part all along the Rhine. The mean number of days with precipitation over .004 inches for the whole area varies from 10 to 18 days.

Mean Precipitation (Values in Parenthesis are for February)

Nurnberg	1.3 in (1.1)
Strasbourg	1.5 in (1.3)
Frankfurt	1.6 in (1.3)
Metz	1.8 in (1.5)
Munich	1.9 in (1.3)
Basel	2.0 in (1.5)
Besancon	3.1 in (2.3)
Feldberg	4.5 in
Freudenstadt	5.7 in

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### Mean Number of Days with Snowcover in March

Karlsruhe	2
Trier	2
Frankfurt	2
Ulm	2
Nurnberg	3
Metz	3
Strasbourg	3
Stuttgart	4
Munich	10
Freudenstadt	14
Feldberg	30

### Mean Number of Days of Snowfall

Stuttgart	5
Ulm	5
Munich	10
Freudenstadt	10
Feldberg	13

### Mean Monthly Snowfall in Inches

Frankfurt	0.3
Kaiserslautern	2.2
Trier	2.8
Nurnberg	3.2
Freiburg	11.1

### CLOUDS AND VISIBILITY

In the Rhine Valley March has the greatest number of clear days observed for the year except for the month of August. Seven to eight is the average number of clear days (less than 2/10 coverage). However, days with coverages of 8/10 or more remain almost the same in number (see below). With a minimum of high pressure centers over France and Western Germany, visibilities improve generally, if slightly, but periods of several days of poor visibility persist during March.

### Number of Days with Low Ceilings and Visibilities (ceilings 100 ft or less and/or visibility 1 1/2 mile or less)

	Ave	Min	Max
Frankfurt	4	1	12
Strasbourg	6	3	10
Nurnberg	7	3	13
Cologne	7	4	100
Munich	8	1	15
Metz	8 1/2	5	15

### Mean Number of Clear and Cloudy Days

(Values for February in parenthesis)

Clear - less than 2/10 sky cover

Partly cloudy - 2/10 to 8/10

Cloudy - 8/10 to overcast

	Clear	Partly Cloudy	Cloudy
Trier	4 (2 1/2)	14 (12 1/2)	13 (13)
Munich	4 (3)	15 (13)	12 (12)
Nurnberg	4 (4)	15 (11)	12 (13)
Karlsruhe	5 (4 1/2)	13 1/2 (10)	12 1/2 (13 1/2)
Lower Main Valley	7 (5)	15 (11)	9 (12)
Frankfurt	7 1/2 (5)	14 1/2 (11)	9 (12)
Strasbourg	8 (7)	13 (9 1/2)	11 (11)

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APPENDIX "A" TO WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY #22 (Cont'd)

SOIL AND WIND

With warmer temperatures in March, evaporation will begin to exceed saturation and the soil begins to dry out. Conditions for freezing ice on the ground may be present for 4 to 6 days, while conditions for frost will be present for 16 to 20 days.

The prevailing surface wind is southwesterly with southerly and westerly winds next in predominance. In the Strasbourg area, 26% of observations show southwesterly winds, 24% southerly and westerly, 11% northerly. Wind velocity remains low. Strasbourg records show 74% of the winds are from 1-7 mph, 15% calm, 11% 8 to 18 mph.

SUNRISE AND SUNSET TABLES FOR MARCH 1945

Strasbourg 48 35N 07 45E 500 feet elevation

MARCH	SUNRISE	SUNSET	MOONRISE	MOONSET	PHASE
1	0710	1814	2042	0834	Full Moon
2	0708	1816	2146	0854	"
3	0707	1817	2249	0914	"
4	0705	1818	2353	0936	"
5	0702	1820	2457	1000	Last Quarter
6	0700	1821		1028	"
7	0658	1823	0202	1103	"
8	0656	1825	0304	1146	"
9	0654	1826	0402	1239	"
10	0652	1828	0455	1344	"
11	0650	1830	0540	1458	"
12	0648	1831	0618	1616	New Moon
13	0646	1833	0651	1639	"
14	0644	1834	0719	1902	"
15	1642	1835	0746	2025	"
16	0640	1837	0812	2148	"
17	0638	1838	0840	2309	"
18	0636	1840	0911		"
19	0633	1841	0946	0027	"
20	0631	1843	1027	0039	First Quarter
21	0629	1845	1116	0244	"
22	0627	1846	1212	0340	"
23	0625	1848	1313	0425	"
24	0623	1849	1416	0502	"
25	0621	1850	1522	0532	"
26	0619	1852	1627	0558	"
27	0617	1853	1730	0620	Full Moon
28	0615	1855	1834	0640	"
29	0613	1856	1937	0659	"
30	0610	1858	2040	0719	"
31	0608	1859	2144	0739	"

All times are "A" Time.

(Source - First T.A.F.)

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